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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In a predecessor symposium on the topic of ecosystem ser-
vices,2 several distinguished scholars suggested that the major 
“failing” of contemporary environmental law is its failure to protect 
                                                                                                                   
 1.  Steven M. Goldstein Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  I 
would like to thank Professors Robin Kundis Craig, Jon Klick, Kenneth Kristl, Dan Markel, 
Joel Mintz, Benjamin Priester and J.B. Ruhl, and several EPA officials, including Beth 
Cavalier and, Melissa Raack of the Special Litigation and Project Division at the EPA Office 
of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, and Jonathan Libber, the BEN Coordinator at 
EPA OECA, for their helpful comments on drafts of this article.  Ms. Cavalier and Ms. 
Raack were quite helpful concerning aspects of EPA’s SEPs program; Mr. Libber provided 
helpful information on EPA’s penalty calculation methodologies.   None of the commenters, 
or EPA as an organization, necessarily endorses the contents of the article and the agency 
officials’ comments should not be taken to constitute such an endorsement.   I am solely 
responsible for the contents of the article.  Please direct any comments to me at 
dmarkell@law.fsu.edu. 
 2.  Symposium, Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).  
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ecosystems and the services they provide.3  Their rationale was 
two-fold.  First, ecosystems and the services they provide are of 
central importance to human and other existence; yet, second, en-
vironmental governance has traditionally given short shrift to the 
protection of such ecosystems and services.  Thus, protection of 
ecosystems and the services they provide is a significant environ-
mental priority that has not engendered a meaningful or effective 
regulatory response. 
 The importance of ecosystems and the services they provide 
does not seem to be in dispute.  A burgeoning literature explains 
that ecosystems provide conditions and processes that are neces-
sary to sustain human life.4  These processes include purifying the 
air we breathe and the water we drink, recycling waste, replenish-
ing soil nutrients, maintaining biodiversity, regulating climate, 
flood and pest control, and pollination.5  Jim Salzman points out in 
a recent article that, for example, “[o]ne cannot begin to under-
stand flood control . . . without realizing the impact that wide-
spread wetland destruction has had on the ecosystem service of 
water retention . . . .”6  This example is particularly salient in light 
of the enormous damage that Hurricane Katrina wrought.  Several 
studies have suggested that past destruction of wetlands contrib-
uted significantly to the devastation from Hurricane Katrina be-
cause the loss of these wetlands reduced the capacity of the natu-
ral environment to retain the water unleashed during the storm.7  
Other examples abound of the services that different types of eco-
 
 3.  James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Eco-
system Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 310 (2001) (claim-
ing that “the single greatest failing of modern environmental law and its greatest challenge 
today [is] the inadequate protection of ecosystems and the services they provide.”).  The 
purported failings of environmental law are legion; no doubt others would have their own 
choice for greatest flaw. See e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforce-
ment in a “Reinvented” State, Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Deterrence-Based Enforcement] (summarizing 
various calls for reform). 
 4.  See e.g., Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NA-
TURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3-4 (Gretchen C. 
Daily ed., 1997); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD 
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (2005); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, 
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 1 (2003) (noting 
that, for example, the human species “has always depended on the services provided by the 
biosphere and its ecosystems.”). 
 5.  See Daily, supra note 4, at 3-4.      
 6.  See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the 
Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2005). 
 7.  See, e.g. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, ET AL, ONE YEAR AFTER KATRINA: LOUISIANA 
STILL A SITTING DUCK: A REPORT CARD AND ROADMAP ON WETLANDS RESTORATION (2006), 
available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/5416_KatrinaReportCard.pdf 
(citing loss of coastal marsh and swamp forests as factors contributing to Louisiana’s in-
creasing vulnerability to hurricanes). 
Spring, 2007]  THINKING INSIDE THE BOX 551 
 
                                                                                                                  
systems provide, and of the enormous value and importance of 
these services.8  Studies indicate that the cost to replace the loss of 
pollinating plants in the United States alone, as one example, 
would be on the order of billions of dollars. 9
 The need for regulation to protect ecosystem services also does 
not appear to be in dispute.10  Some scholars have suggested that 
environmental law and policy have essentially “ignored” the chal-
lenge of protecting ecosystems and their services, despite their im-
portance.11  While market-based approaches and other strategies 
that do not, in at least some formulations, require regulatory in-
tervention hold promise and deserve consideration as well,12 the 
practical consequence of current market failures and the absence 
of regulatory gap-filling is that those who engage in activities that 
harm ecosystems and the services they provide are not being held 
fully accountable for, or expected fully to address, these “negative 
externalit[ies].”13
 
 8.  See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 6, at 871-72. 
 9.  See, e.g.,  id. at 872 and n. 2. 
 10.  There is a vast literature on the appropriateness of regulation in different cir-
cumstances.  See e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 68 (Wallace E. Oates ed. 1992); Don Fullerton & Robert N. Stavins, How 
Economists See the Environment, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READ-
INGS 3, 5 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 4th ed. 2000) (noting that “negative externalit[ies],” such as 
pollution, may produce a total social cost of production that exceeds the value to consumers, 
so that regulation is appropriate because, “[i]f the market is left to itself, too many pollu-
tion-generating products are made.”).  R. David Simpson highlights the need to consider the 
value of ecosystem services in formulating regulatory strategies in Economic Analysis and 
Ecosystems: Some Concepts and Issues, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT; SELECTED 
READINGS 529, 536-37 (suggesting that “[g]overnments must act to correct ‘externalities.’ . . 
. . Pollution is the ‘classical example’ of [a negative externality.]  . . . [W]e need to think 
about the value of ecosystems and environmental amenities in order to make reasonable 
social decisions concerning their conservation.  The fact that many of the things we care 
about are not traded in the existing economic system makes it more, rather than less, im-
portant that we think carefully about what their values really are.”).  
 11.  Salzman, Thompson & Daily, supra note 3, at 311, 312 (concluding that “[d]espite 
their obvious importance to our wellbeing, ecosystem services have largely been ignored in 
environmental law and policy.”).  For articles considering the adequacy of different envi-
ronmental laws for protection of ecosystem services, see for example, Robert L. Fischman, 
The EPA’s NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497, (2001) (examin-
ing “the relationship between the EPA's NEPA duties and valuation of ecosystem services”); 
J. B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case 
Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365 (2001) (discussing the 
federal wetland mitigation banking experience); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Ser-
vices, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 899 (1997); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the 
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (examining use of 
environmental trading markets (ETMs)); Salzman, Thompson, & Daily, supra note 3, at 311 
(citing Janet S. Herman et al., Groundwater Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 479, 
481 (2001)). 
 12.  See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 
16 J. L. & ECON. 11, 29-32 (1973) (concluding that there are situations in which the benefits 
from ecosystems involved in pollination have been internalized through contracts that bee 
keepers and farmers have negotiated).     
 13.  See e.g., Fullerton & Stavins, supra note 10, at 5.  
552  JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 22.2 
 
                                                                                                                  
 This Article focuses primarily on the possible role that the 
“back end” of the regulatory state, notably environmental enforce-
ment, may play in protecting ecosystems and the services they 
provide.14  Effective enforcement has long been recognized to be a 
central feature of effective regulation.15  The oft-stated premise is 
that without enforcement, compliance would suffer significantly, 
thereby undermining achievement of the normative goals of under-
lying legislation.16  For example, government permits that are in-
tended to protect the environment by limiting destruction of wet-
lands or discharges of pollutants into streams are unlikely to be as 
effective as possible if the regulated parties that are subject to 
these permits violate their terms.17  While improved regulatory 
norms may be needed as well, regulated party compliance with the 
norms that are in place is likely to advance protection of the envi-
 
 14.  My main purpose in this article is to make the general point that enforcement has 
promise as a mechanism for protecting ecosystem services, and to explore the different types 
of enforcement relief that may be especially valuable. To some degree, I conflate the con-
cepts of protecting ecosystem functions and maintaining or protecting ecosystem services in 
order to facilitate my making this broader point. While the two are, of course, related, there 
are important distinctions as well. Enforcement intended to protect the environment may be 
structured to protect ecosystem services, or not. For example, as Professor Ruhl points out 
in his wetlands piece, wetland banking might be neutral with respect to ecological functions 
in a watershed but, because it moves wetlands, have negative effects on the distribution and 
absolute total of ecosystem services within the watershed. See Ruhl & Gregg, supra note 11. 
Thus, if, for instance, a violator destroys or degrades wetlands in one location (place A), and 
the government, through an enforcement action, enjoins the violator to restore wetlands in a 
different location (place B), that injunctive relief might make the environment whole in the 
sense that it would address any aggregate ecological impacts, but that relief might not re-
store service values to the human population around place A. This distinction between eco-
system functions and services has implications for the type of relief that is appropriate if the 
goal is to redress harm to ecosystem services (in addition to redressing harm to ecosystem 
functions). Those interested in pursuing relief that advances ecosystem services in particu-
lar would be well-advised to keep this distinction in mind, particularly to the degree that a 
purpose of such relief is to redress the harm to ecosystem services that a violation causes. 
One option is to require relief that would, in some way, offset the loss of the lost or reduced 
ecosystem services.  
 15.  See generally, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000) (noting the importance of 
public enforcement of law).   Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 12; 
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 224 (1955).   
 16.  Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 10-12. 
 17.  There are questions concerning optimal levels of compliance, and optimal levels of 
environmental protection. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncom-
pliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 
(1999); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 15, at 72 (concluding that “it . . . appears that these 
[present] levels [of deterrence] are often too low.…  [S]ociety probably should raise levels of 
deterrence in many areas of enforcement.”)  I do not address these issues here.   Compliance 
with norms is a significant issue at all levels of governance. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée, Multi-
lateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum, in MULTILEVEL GOV-
ERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY 
AND THE LAW 387, 387 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006) (noting that “[t]he promotion of compliance 
with international environmental commitments is among the most challenging issues of 
global environmental governance.”). 
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ronment, including protection of ecosystems and the services they 
provide. 
 I focus on the possible value that each of three “tools” in the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) enforcement tool box 
— 1) penalties, 2) injunctive relief, and 3) a form of “beyond com-
pliance” injunctive relief, known as SEPs -- has for producing eco-
system benefits.18  Theoretically, there are at least five ways in 
which enforcement has the potential to protect the environment, 
including ecosystems and the services they provide.  First, en-
forcement has the potential to prevent harm to ecosystems by de-
terring violations that would cause such harm.  Second, enforce-
ment has the capacity to require violators to cease violations that 
are causing or threatening harm.  Third, enforcement includes the 
authority to require violators to fix ecosystems they have harmed 
(to restore or remediate harmed ecosystems).  Fourth, EPA has 
used enforcement to negotiate settlements that commit violators to 
take action to benefit the environment in circumstances in which 
EPA otherwise lacks the legal authority to compel performance of 
such projects or to undertake them itself (to achieve protection “be-
yond compliance”).  Finally, enforcement has the capacity to ad-
vance learning that will help to protect ecosystems and the ser-
vices they provide.19
 The three enforcement tools I discuss in this Article appear to 
have the potential to protect ecosystems in several ways.  For ex-
ample, EPA’s power to penalize violators enables the agency to de-
 
 18.  For a summary of different regulatory tools and approaches, see for example, U.S. 
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S 
GUIDE OTA-ENV-634 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1995). 
 19.   For a recent assessment of key data needs, see for example, THE H. JOHN HEINZ 
III CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORITY 
DATA NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM 
CONDITION 27 (2006), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/Programs/Reporting/Working% 
20Groups/Data%20Gaps/Gaps_LongReport_LoRes.pdf (identifying ten key information gaps 
that “prevent effective reporting on . . . the condition and use of U.S. ecosystems” and thus 
limit our capacity for informed decision making.)  A 2002 Heinz Center Report previously 
found that nearly half of the 103 “ecosystem indicators” that “described ecological conditions 
in the nation’s coasts and oceans, farmlands, forests, fresh waters, grasslands and shrub-
lands, and urban and suburban areas” could not be reported on because of data gaps and 
other deficiencies. Id. at 13. See THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS: MEASURING THE LANDS, 
WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 33-195 (2002), available at 
http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/pdf_files/sotne_complete.pdf. There is also much to 
learn in terms of valuing ecosystems and their services. See, e.g., Jason F. Shogren, A Politi-
cal Economy in an Ecological Web, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READ-
INGS, supra note 10, at 646, 656 (noting “that while nonuse values may be a valid concept, 
the measurement tool is still blunt.”); Simpson, supra note 10, at 540 (“economists cannot 
make any very precise statements about the values of most ecological goods and services. . . 
. It will be a long time . . . before we can make as strong statements about the value of eco-
logical goods and services as we can about, say, the value of a potato or a haircut.”). 
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ter violations, particularly to deter regulated parties from violating 
the law in ways that harm the environment (including ecosystems 
and the services they provide).20  EPA claims the injunctive au-
thority as part of its enforcement arsenal to require regulated par-
ties to end violations that are causing such harm and to repair any 
harm their violations have caused.21  In addition, for over two dec-
ades EPA has used its enforcement authorities to negotiate set-
tlements of enforcement cases that commit violators to take steps 
to protect and restore the environment that go “beyond compli-
ance,” that is, beyond their obligations under the law.22  Each of 
these enforcement tools has the potential to advance learning that 
is likely to be helpful in protecting ecosystems and their services.  
Further, the latter two tools empower EPA to shift the burden of 
doing much of this ecosystem-beneficial work to the regulated 
community.23  This feature is likely to be of particular appeal, es-
pecially during times characterized by scarce government re-
sources and limited government capacity (i.e., all times).  Enforce-
ment offers an opportunity for environmental progress and new 
learning that, quite simply, is not likely to occur if it were depend-
ent entirely on government resources and initiatives. 
 Part II of this Article provides an overview of regulatory en-
forcement that offers a framework for considering the possible util-
ity of enforcement in protecting ecosystems and their services.  
Parts III-V review in more detail the three types of relief listed 
above, notably penalties (Part III), injunctive relief (Part IV), and 
“beyond compliance” actions that EPA commits regulated parties 
to complete through negotiated settlements of enforcement pro-
ceedings (Part V).24  I also include a brief conclusion. 
 
 20.  See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVI-
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (2003). 
 21.  See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 
24796, 24797 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter Final SEPs Policy]. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Some economists would look at the efficiency of such expenditures regardless of 
the party bearing them. 
 24.  While my effort in this article is to focus on current key elements of EPA’s en-
forcement tool box, there obviously are an enormous range of possible mechanisms and ap-
proaches that may be helpful in protecting ecosystems and the services they provide.   As 
indicated in the text, this article focuses on the relatively incremental approach of revamp-
ing existing regulatory enforcement approaches as a possible strategy to increase protection 
(including enhancement and restoration) of ecosystems that provide important services; it 
does not consider fundamental restructuring of our regulatory apparatus as a way to 
achieve this goal.   
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF EPA REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT25
A. The Level and Nature of EPA Enforcement Activity 
 EPA’s enforcement world is a busy one.  Agency officials under-
take a significant number of inspections each year in order to 
monitor compliance with the various environmental regulatory 
statutes.  In FY 2005, for example, EPA staff conducted 22,000 in-
spections and investigations.26  Through a variety of means, in-
cluding government inspections, self-reporting by regulated par-
ties, and tips that workers and members of the public provide, 
Agency staff annually discover significant numbers of violations, 
including a substantial number that are serious enough to warrant 
formal enforcement.  To use the statistics from EPA’s most recent 
fiscal year again, in FY 2005 EPA issued a total of 2,229 adminis-
trative penalty complaints and initiated 259 civil judicial referrals 
(generally, referrals to the Department of Justice of cases involv-
ing violations of environmental laws for filing of civil complaints in 
federal court).27  In FY 2005, EPA finalized a total of 2,273 admin-
 
 25.  This article focuses on traditional enforcement situations, in which a regulated 
party violates the law and the government decides to undertake a formal enforcement ac-
tion against the party in order to obtain an adequate penalty and, potentially, appropriate 
injunctive relief.   The government uses a wide variety of compliance promotion tools beyond 
traditional enforcement.   See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, GOAL 5-1 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/cfo/ 
finstatement/2005par/par05.pdf [hereinafter EPA FY 2005 Report]; Markell, Deterrence-
Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 8; RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 60-
83. While these are worth considering for their possible relevance to ecosystem services, 
they are not the focus of this Article. 
 26.  EPA FY 2005 REPORT, GOAL 5, supra note 25, at 160; see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS: FY2005 NUMBERS AT A 
GLANCE [hereinafter NUMBERS AT A GLANCE], http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
reports/endofyear/eoy2005/2005numbers.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) EPA’s enforcement 
efforts represent the tip of the iceberg in the enforcement arena.   In many states, for one or 
more of the major pollution control regulatory programs, state officials have primary im-
plementation responsibility.   David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its 
Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2005) 
[hereinafter Markell, Slack]. This includes conducting inspections, reviewing facility-
generated reports, identifying instances of significant non-compliance for possible follow-up 
action, and undertaking such action in appropriate circumstances, either through adminis-
trative or judicial enforcement.   See, e.g., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF STATES & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, ONE STOP REPORTING PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANT REPORTING DATA IN 
EPA'S NATIONAL SYSTEMS: DATA COLLECTION BY STATE AGENCIES 1 (1999) (suggesting that 
states conduct approximately ninety percent of all inspections and initiate more than eighty 
percent of all enforcement actions each year). The ideas explored in this Article are poten-
tially relevant to state enforcement efforts as well.  Furthermore, some of the regulatory 
statutes require regulated parties to monitor their own compliance and to report the results 
to the government. The Clean Water Act discharge monitoring report (DMR) program is 
probably the best example of this approach. 
 27.  OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EVNTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA FY 2005 COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS 7, 9 (2005) [herein-
after Annual Results], available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/end-
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istrative penalty order settlements and 157 civil judicial conclu-
sions.28  In FY 2005, EPA enforcement addressed a total of 5,137 
facilities in 4,346 cases.29
 In short, on an annual basis, EPA: 1) invests considerable re-
sources in the enforcement arena; 2) discovers a substantial num-
ber of significant violations; and 3) in numerous cases, initiates, 
and ultimately completes, enforcement action.30  In many of these 
cases the Agency imposes penalties and requires significant viola-
tors to reduce pollutant discharges or otherwise act in ways that 
enhance protection of human health and the environment.  In-
creasingly, EPA has sought to monitor and measure the environ-
mental impacts (benefits) of its enforcement actions.  According to 
an EPA FY 2005 report, “28.8 percent of enforcement actions re-
quired that pollutants be reduced, treated, or eliminated and popu-
lations and ecosystems be protected.”31
 In the following section I review the nature and mechanics of 
contemporary enforcement in order to explore in some detail the 
opportunities that this significant level of government activity po-
tentially affords for protection of ecosystem services. 
B. An Overview of Traditional Enforcement32
 The enforcement process, considered broadly, includes several 
steps.  Key elements include: 1) monitoring regulated parties’ per-
formance of their legal obligations; 2) identification of violators; 3) 
prioritization of violations (deciding which violations to pursue and 
which to give low priority); 4) choice of an enforcement or compli-
ance-promotion approach in particular cases;33 5) pursuit of the 
selected approach in cases for which the Agency decides action is 
warranted; and 6) post-action follow-up (e.g., to assess whether a 
violator has returned to compliance).34
 
ofyear/eoy2005/2005resultscharts.pdf; NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26.    
 28.  Annual Results, supra note 27, at 8, 10; NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26.    
 29.  Annual Results, supra note 27, at 12.    
 30.  I do not address here the merits of criticisms that there have been declines in 
recent years in EPA (and state) enforcement activity.   
 31.  EPA FY 2005 REPORT, Goal 5-3, supra note 25, at 152.  Markell, Slack, supra note 
26, at 59.  
 32.  For a more comprehensive treatment of EPA enforcement, see generally, RECHT-
SCHAFFEN & MARKELL , supra note 20; JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH 
STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (Univ. of Texas 1995); Joel A. Mintz, “Neither the Best of Times 
Nor the Worst of Times”: EPA Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, 35 ELR 
10390 (June 2005).    
 33.  EPA has expressed considerable interest in recent years in pursuing more coop-
erative and less adversarial responses to non-compliance, as have the states. RECHTSCHAF-
FEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 59. 
 34.    As is the case with many lists, this one creates somewhat artificial categories.   
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 EPA does not pursue a formal enforcement action in the vast 
majority of situations in which it uncovers violations.35  As might 
be expected, EPA’s policy is to reserve initiation of formal enforce-
ment proceedings for the most serious violations.  Many of EPA’s 
programs characterize these violators as being in “significant non-
compliance,” or SNC.36
 The criteria EPA uses to determine the types of violations that 
are significant and that warrant formal enforcement action have 
been the subject of considerable debate over the years.37  Each of 
EPA’s major regulatory programs has developed specific defini-
tions of “significant noncompliance.”38  In some cases the program 
offices have revisited these definitions periodically.39  But, as 
might be expected, a constant is that a key factor or criterion has 
been the extent to which a violation has caused or threatened sig-
nificant harm to human health or the environment.40
 EPA often considers seeking a variety of types of relief for vio-
lations for which the Agency determines formal enforcement action 
is warranted.  EPA typically will seek to require such violators to 
 
It is possible (and reasonable) to categorize the enforcement process in different ways.   U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, 1-5 (Feb. 1992).   
Many of these elements include several components.   Monitoring, for example, requires 
deciding which sources to monitor (priority-setting, etc.), determining the nature of the 
monitoring effort (the development of monitoring protocols and the like and deciding the 
appropriate level of monitoring for different situations), and scheduling and performance of 
inspections and other monitoring activities.  
 35.  RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 82 (citing Richard G. Kozlowski & 
Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Lion or Lamb?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Win-
ter 1996, at 62).  Instead, the Agency pursues informal strategies intended to promote com-
pliance.  RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20, at 82 (citing SUSAN HUNTER & RICH-
ARD WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 50-65 (1996)). 
 36.  Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 4; Markell, Slack, supra 
note 26. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 20. There are instances in which the 
Agency has departed from the SNC convention. See, for example, the Clean Air Act pro-
gram’s use of the phrase “high priority violations.” Memorandum from Eric Shaeffer, Direc-
tor, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Issuance of Policy on 
Timely and Appropriate Enforcement Response to High Priority Violations 3 (Dec. 22, 1998) 
[hereinafter EPA Memo], available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ 
civil/caa/stationary/issue-ta-rpt.pdf.  
 37.  Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 24. 
 38.  Id. at 43. For a recent example, see the EPA’s draft guidance for wet weather 
discharges under the Clean Water Act, which describes circumstances in which such dis-
charges constitute “significant” non-compliance with CWA permits.  National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Requirements for Peak Wet Weather Dis-
charges From Publicly Owned Treatment Works Treatment Plants Serving Separate Sani-
tary Sewer Collection Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 76013, 76015-18 (U.S. Entl. Prot. Agency Dec. 
22, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WATER/2005/December/Day-
22/w7696.htm. 
 39.  Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3 at 45; RECHTSCHAFFEN & 
MARKELL, supra note 20, at 164.  
 40.   See e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HAZARDOUS WASTE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 
RESPONSE POLICY 4 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/finalerp1203.pdf. 
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pay a penalty.41  Each of the major environmental regulatory stat-
utes contains a list of factors courts and EPA are to consider in de-
termining appropriate penalty amounts in particular cases.42  The 
Agency generally considers three primary factors in determining 
the appropriate size of a payable penalty — the “economic benefit” 
the violator gained through its violations, an additional “gravity” 
component that is based on the seriousness of the violation and 
that is intended to put the violator in a worse position than a com-
petitor that is in compliance with its legal obligations, and any “ad-
justment” factors, such as ability to pay.43
 In addition, particularly in cases in which a violation is ongoing 
or there is a reasonable likelihood that a violation will recur, and 
in situations in which the violation has caused an adverse impact 
on human health or the environment, EPA will consider injunctive 
relief, through which the Agency will require a violator to return to 
compliance and to fix or remediate any environmental harm its 
violations caused.44
 In some cases, EPA pursues other forms of relief as well.  I fo-
cus on one such form of relief in this article, notably environmen-
tally beneficial projects that violators agree to undertake, even 
though they do not have a legal obligation to do so.  These are ne-
gotiated projects incorporated into formal settlements used to re-
solve enforcement actions without litigation (or to conclude litiga-
tion).  As part of such settlements, EPA generally reduces a viola-
tor’s payable penalty as the quid pro quo for the violator’s com-
mitment to perform such “beyond compliance” work.  EPA labels 
these actions Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs).45
 The following data, from EPA’s report for the most recent fed-
eral Fiscal Year (2005), entitled FY 2005 Compliance & Enforce-
ment Annual Results, shows the dollar value for each of the past 
five years of each of these types of relief — penalties, injunctive 
relief, and SEPs.  As the Annual Results data reflects, in FY 2005 
 
 41.  See e.g., EPA Memo, supra note 36, at 15.  
 42.  33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 3008 (2000). Under most regulatory statutes 
EPA has the authority to bring an enforcement action administratively or judicially. See 
e.g., CWA § 309(b), (d); CAA § 113(b); RCRA § 3008(a), (g) (all authorizing civil actions); 
CWA § 309(g); CAA § 113(d) (authorizing administrative enforcement penalties for viola-
tions) 
 43.  See infra note 57 and Part II.B.  
 44.  See CWA § 309(b); United States v. Alcoa Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (N.D. Ind. 
2000).  
 45.  See infra Part IV.  EPA has a variety of other enforcement-based tools as well 
that I do not address in this article, including the authority to modify and revoke permits. 
See e.g., HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY, supra note 40, at 9.  See also David L. Markell, States 
as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to 
Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994) (discussing 
several types of enforcement authorities). 
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EPA obtained relief worth more than $10 billion through its en-
forcement efforts: $154 million in payable penalties; $10 billion in 
injunctive relief; and $57 million in violators’ commitments to con-
duct SEPs.46  This is obviously a substantial amount of enforce-
ment-generated relief.  To provide one basis for comparison, the 
value of this relief exceeds EPA’s entire budget, which in FY 2005 
was less than $8 billion.47
 
 
 
 The question for this article is whether there is a role for one or 
more of these forms of relief in protecting and restoring ecosystems 
                                                                                                                   
 46.  These figures understate the scope of government enforcement quite significantly 
because they only cover EPA civil enforcement efforts.   EPA also pursues criminal enforce-
ment in appropriate cases.  NUMBERS AT A GLANCE, supra note 26.  Further, the figures do 
not include information on enforcement relief obtained through state and local government 
enforcement efforts.    
 
 47.  See Budget of the United States Government, FY 2007, http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/budget/fy2007/epa.html (lasted visited Aug. 19, 2007) (indicating that EPA’s total 
outlay in 2005 was just under $8 billion). 
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and the services they provide.  I turn now to a more detailed look 
at each of these forms of traditional enforcement relief in order to 
explore this issue. 
III. A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT PENALTY CALCULATIONS 
 This section contains an elaboration on five points that I think 
are worth making in considering the promise of penalties for pro-
tecting ecosystems and their services.  First, penalties give EPA 
leverage to deter violators from committing violations that will 
harm or threaten to harm such ecosystems and their services.48  
Related, Congress has periodically ramped up penalty levels to en-
sure EPA’s legal authorities are adequate to give it substantial 
penalty leverage to promote deterrence.49  Second, Congress and 
EPA have embraced an “economic benefit plus gravity” framework 
for determining appropriate penalties in particular cases; penalties 
are to be sufficient to “disgorge economic benefit” (that is, to re-
quire a violator to pay an amount at least equal to the economic 
benefit it gained through its violation), and also are to include a 
“gravity” component that is tailored to the seriousness of the viola-
tion and puts the violator in worse position financially than if it 
had complied with its legal obligations.50  Third, there is theoreti-
cal support for EPA’s paying attention to harm in calculating pen-
alties, in addition to considering economic benefit.51  Fourth, there 
is reason to believe that EPA may not be fully exploiting the lever-
age its penalty authorities provide it to promote deterrence be-
cause of the relatively little attention the Agency traditionally has 
given in determining penalties to the harm (especially harm to 
ecosystem services) that violations cause or threaten.52  Finally, 
there appears to be at least some practical capacity for EPA to do 
better—that is, to increase the attention it gives to harm (includ-
ing harm to ecosystem services) in calculating penalties.53
 In short, my premise is that, while 1) EPA’s legal penalty au-
thorities give it the ability to deter violations, including violations 
that harm ecosystems and the services they provide, through im-
 
 48.  Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 3, at 40.  I am not suggesting 
that EPA is obligated to determine that any particular level of harm occurred when deciding 
to pursue an enforcement case or determining to impose a penalty.  Instead, EPA’s legal 
authorities generally impose strict liability and do not require EPA to establish that a viola-
tion caused or threatened harm as a predicate for suit.  
 49.  Infra note 54 and related text.  See also Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, 
supra note 3. 
 50.  See infra Part III.B 
 51.  See infra Part III.C.  
 52.  See infra Part III.D. 
 53.  Id. 
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position of penalties that disgorge economic benefit and are tai-
lored to the seriousness of the harm the violation caused or threat-
ened, 2) theoretically, it makes sense for EPA to use this authority, 
and 3) as a practical matter, EPA has some  capacity to do so, 4) 
there is reason to consider whether EPA is not using these au-
thorities as effectively as it should to deter significant violations 
because it is not paying enough attention to harm (including harm 
to ecosystem services) in calculating penalties.  In the remaining 
portion of this section, I work through these four issues, pointing 
out the significant empirical and other questions that need to be 
addressed in testing the accuracy of this premise. 
A. EPA’s Authority to Impose Penalties to Deter Significant  
Violations 
 EPA’s authority to impose penalties gives the Agency signifi-
cant leverage to create general and specific deterrence in order to 
reduce the number and significance of violations of the environ-
mental laws.  Under many of the significant regulatory statutes, 
EPA can impose substantial penalties — up to $32,500 per day, 
per violation.54  As a result, the maximum statutory penalty for a 
set of violations can be quite high.  For example, if a regulated 
party violates a law such as the Clean Water Act for thirty days, 
the total maximum penalty is $975,000 (thirty x $32,500).  If the 
regulated party has committed three different violations of the 
Clean Water Act for a month, the total maximum potential penalty 
increases to $2,925,000 ($975,000 x three).  For cases that involve 
multiple violations that continue for an extended period of time, in 
short, the violator is potentially subject to significant penalties, 
which easily extend into the multi-million dollar range.55
 EPA enforcement policies make it clear that, as noted above, 
the EPA staff are to consider three key factors in determining ap-
 
 54.  Congress has increased the maximum penalties significantly over the years for 
violations of major environmental regulatory statutes such as the Clean Water Act, Clean 
Air Act, and RCRA.  For example, the CWA provided for penalties not to exceed $10,000 per 
day of violation until Congress increased this maximum civil penalty amount to $25,000 per 
day in the 1987 Amendments. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title V, §313, 
101 Stat. 45 (Feb. 4, 1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319).    Because Congress provided for 
penalties to keep pace with inflation, the current statutory maximum is $32,500. Adjust-
ment of Civil and Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. 819.4 (2007).    
 55.  A January 2007 search of EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
(ECHO) database found that, in 2006, EPA settled 24 cases in which it assessed penalties of 
$500,000 or more. Four of those were administrative cases, the rest judicial. See 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/index.html. See e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a violation of a monthly 
average parameter constitutes a violation of each day of the month); cf. U.S. v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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propriate penalty amounts.  First, the staff are to consider the eco-
nomic benefit the regulated party gained through its violations.  
Second, the staff are to consider the gravity or seriousness of the 
violations.  Finally, staff consider “adjustment” factors, such as 
ability to pay.56
 EPA has made considerable progress in making the calculation 
of economic benefit more routine, systematic, and consistent.  It 
has developed an interactive computer model known as BEN to 
facilitate calculation of economic benefit.57  BEN is intended to be 
a user-friendly tool that “yields a reliable, objective dollar figure” 
that represents the economic benefit a violator gained through its 
violations.58  The Science Advisory Board (SAB) has concluded, 
and EPA enforcement officials have acknowledged, that the 
Agency devotes the majority of its penalty calculation efforts to de-
termining the economic benefit associated with particular viola-
tions.59  The SAB has characterized recapturing economic benefit 
that accrues from noncompliance as “the cornerstone” of EPA’s ob-
jective of using penalties to deter violators.60
 It is clear that Congress intended that EPA consider the seri-
ousness or gravity of a violation in determining an appropriate 
penalty.  Most of the major statutes direct EPA to do so.  Section 
309(d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) (covering civil penalties), for 
example, provides that: “In determining the amount of a civil pen-
alty the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation. . . . .”61 
Similarly, CWA section 309(g)(3) (covering administrative penal-
ties) provides that: “In determining the amount of any penalty . . . 
 
 56.  See e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES 
(GM-21) (Feb. 16, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES], available at 
http://www.wildlaw.org/Eco-Laws/civ-pen.htm. 
 57.  ENFORCEMENT ECONOMIC MODELS, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/civil/econ 
models/index.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2007).  For articles about BEN by an EPA lawyer 
who serves as the BEN Model Coordinator, see Jonathan Libber, Making the Polluter Pay: 
EPA’s Experience in Recapturing a violator’s Economic Benefit from Noncompliance, 5th 
Int’l Conf. on Envtl Compliance and Enforcement 465 (1998); Jonathan D. Libber, Penalty 
Assessment at the Environmental Protection Agency: A View From Inside, 35 S.D. L. REV. 
189, 193-97 (1990) [hereinafter Libber, View from Inside]. The Agency has refined its BEN 
model several times. There is a long-standing debate about the appropriate scope of BEN, 
particularly concerning the extent to which EPA should consider “illegally-obtained” profits 
in calculating economic benefit. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, AN 
ADVISORY OF THE ILLEGAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (ICA) ECONOMIC BENEFIT (EB) ADVI-
SORY PANEL OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, EPA-SAB-ADV-05-003 (Sept. 7, 2005) 
[hereinafter SAB Report]. I do not address these issues here. 
 58.  Jonathan Libber, EPA’s BEN Model Coordinator, indicates that 27 states were 
using BEN to some degree as of 1990. Libber, View from Inside, supra note 57, at 193. 
 59.  See SAB Report, supra note 57;  Letter from Granta Y. Nakayama, Asst. Adm’r, 
EPA, to M. Granger Morgan, Chair of EPA Science Advisory Board (Feb. 21, 2006) [herein-
after EPA Comment on SAB Report] (on file with the author). 
 60.  SAB report, supra note 57, at 10. 
 61.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(2002) (emphasis added). 
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the Administrator . . . shall take into account the nature, circum-
stances, extent and gravity of the violation” in addition to the eco-
nomic benefit the violator gained through the violation.62  Section 
3008(a)(3) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
likewise requires that, in “assessing . . . a penalty, the Administra-
tor shall take into account the seriousness of the violation.”63
 It is also clear that in referring to “seriousness” or “gravity” of a 
violation, Congress intended that EPA consider the environmental 
harm or potential harm that a violation caused in determining an 
appropriate penalty amount.64  Numerous courts have so con-
cluded.65  Courts have increased the gravity component of a pen-
alty in situations involving significant harm.66  On the flip side, 
courts have viewed the lack of such harm as a “significant mitigat-
ing factor” in determining a penalty amount, even in cases involv-
ing substantial numbers of violations.67
 In short, there is no statutory impediment to EPA’s considering 
actual or potential environmental harm (including harm to ecosys-
tems and the services they provide) in determining penalty 
amounts.  Instead, Congress intended and directed that the 
 
 62.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3)(2002) (emphasis added). 
 63.  42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3)(2002). In the criminal context, the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines indicate that a court should enhance a defendant’s offense level if the site cleanup 
“required a substantial expenditure.” U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(b)(3)(1993)(requiring an enhance-
ment “if cleanup [associated with an offense] required a substantial expenditure, increase 
by 4 levels.” ) See also U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2 (addressing toxic and hazardous pollutants); U. S. v. 
Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that courts should include calcula-
tions of cleanup expenses, including CERCLA expenses, in deciding whether to enhance a 
sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3((b)(3)).  See also, U.S. v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 
(concluding that “preliminary [site] examination [costs], which exceeded thirty thousand 
dollars, are properly considered cleanup costs.”). 
 64.  See e.g., U.S. v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2002); Catskill Moun-
tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F.Supp. 2d 41, 49-50 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that under the Clean Water Act courts should consider the severity 
of the violations and their effect on the environment in determining penalties). 
 65.  Trout Unlimited, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 2d at 50; U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
Atl. 786 F.Sup. 747-49; Salmon of Maine, L.L.C., 257 F.Supp. 2d 407, 428 (D. Me. 2003) 
(noting that the violations in this case “are of a significant nature. . . because they . . . inflict 
a significant short-term damage on the environment . . . and endanger the survival of the 
wild Atlantic salmon.”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding that “[t]he presence or absence of 
environmental harm is relevant to the assessment of a Clean Water Act penalty.”).  
 66.  EPA notes that “Courts have considered the extent of environmental harm asso-
ciated with violations in determining the ‘seriousness of violations’ pursuant to the factors 
in 309(d).” Revised Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy, Environmental 
Protection Agency, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 35618, 35622 n.18 (1995). 
 67.  Laidlaw, Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, at 602 (citing Hawaii’s 1000 Friends v. City and 
County of Honolulu, 821 F.Supp. 1368, 1395-96 (D. Haw. 1993)) (adopting the view that “the 
lack of [demonstrated] material harm . . . [is] a significant mitigating factor in assessing 
penalties.”).  But compare Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 
786 F.Sup. 747-49 (N. D. Ind. 1992), with U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 338, 
344 (D. Va. 1997). 
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Agency do so. 
 It also is clear that EPA has taken several steps to “operation-
alize” this Congressional direction to consider the significance of 
violations, including the harm the violations cause, in determining 
penalties.  The Agency has developed general enforcement guid-
ance that adheres to this statutory direction.  EPA’s 1984 over-
arching enforcement directive, entitled A Framework for Statute-
Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments: Implementing EPA’s 
Policy on Civil Penalties,68 directs each EPA media program (wa-
ter, air, etc.) to “develop a system for quantifying the gravity of vio-
lations of the laws and regulations it administers.”69  The Frame-
work indicates that the system “must be based, whenever possible, 
on objective indicators of the seriousness of the violation.”  The 
Framework provides that “[t]he seriousness of the violation should 
be based primarily on: 1) the risk of harm inherent in the violation 
at the time it was committed and 2) the actual harm that resulted 
from the violation.”70  In other words, elaborating on the “gravity 
component” of penalty calculation, the Framework directs EPA 
                                                                                                                   
 68.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES 
TO PENALTY ASSESSMENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPA’s POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (Feb. 16, 
1984) [hereinafter 1984 Framework], available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/guidance 
documents/htmls/AD03225.htm. EPA intended that this Framework “provid[e] a framework 
for medium-specific penalty policies.” EPA’s Framework is intended to be a companion 
document to the Agency’s 1984 Policy on Civil Penalties, which was to “establish a consis-
tent Agency-wide approach to the assessment of civil penalties. . . ,” and “to promote the 
goals of deterrence, fair and equitable treatment of the regulated community, and swift 
resolution of environmental problems.” Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Asst. Adm’r, 
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (Feb. 15, 1984) (on file with author). EPA in-
tended in the Policy on Civil Penalties to “focus[] on the general philosophy” behind EPA’s 
approach to penalties. Id.  
The Policy directs EPA staff to assess penalties with three main components: 1) a 
“benefit” component — “penalties generally should, at a minimum, remove any significant 
economic benefits resulting from failure to comply with the law [p. 3], 2) a “gravity” compo-
nent that “reflects the seriousness of the violation,” and 3) consideration of “adjustment” 
factors such as ability to pay.  POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56 at 3, 4, 8. Courts 
have recognized that economic benefit may be difficult to estimate and, as a result, 
“[r]easonable approximations . . . will suffice”. U.S. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 
529 (4th Cir 1999) (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals Inc., 913 F2d 64, 80 (3d. Cir. 1990)). One court has suggested that the court’s job is 
to reach a “rational estimate…resolving uncertainties in favor of a higher estimate.” U.S. v. 
Municipal Authority of Union Township, 929 F.Supp. 800, 806 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing 
Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1558). In the court’s view, “[i]t would eviscerate the [CWA] to 
allow violators to escape civil penalties on the ground that such penalties cannot be calcu-
lated with precision.” Id. at 806-7.   
The Policy on Civil Penalties indicates the benefit and gravity components will yield a 
“preliminary deterrence amount” that is subject to adjustment based on several factors. 
1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, at 8. The Policy indicates that EPA should provide spe-
cific incentives to settle by considering reducing the gravity component in situations in 
which the violator institutes expeditious remedies to the identified violations and under-
takes additional environmental cleanup. Id. at 6.    
 69.  1984 Framework, supra note 68, at app. II.A. 
 70.  Id. 
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staff to assess violations according to the seriousness of the viola-
tion(s), with seriousness to be determined based on factors includ-
ing “actual or possible harm.”71
 The Framework also directs staff to quantify the seriousness of 
violations.  The Framework’s offers the following guidance for do-
ing so: 
Assigning a dollar figure to represent the gravity of 
a violation is an essentially subjective process.   
Nevertheless, the relative seriousness of different 
violations can be fairly accurately determined in 
most cases.  This can be accomplished by reference 
to the goals of the specific regulatory scheme and the 
facts of each particular violation.  Thus, linking the 
dollar amount of the gravity component to these ob-
jective factors is a useful way of ensuring that viola-
tions of approximately equal seriousness are treated 
the same way.72   
 Beyond its overarching Framework, EPA has further opera-
tionalized or implemented its approach to penalty calculation 
through development of a series of program-specific policies.  EPA 
has issued at least 35 “penalty policies” or “enforcement response 
policies” for its different programs.73  There are variations among 
these policies in their approach to environmental harm, but the 
idea that EPA should consider environmental harm as a factor in 
determining penalties is a common feature of these policies.74
 
 71. 1984 Framework, supra note 68, at II. The Framework provides that EPA should 
consider the amount and toxicity of any pollutants involved, as well as the sensitivity of the 
environment, in evaluating actual or possible harm. Id. See also SAB Report, supra note 57, 
at II. (noting that EPA is to rank violations based on the seriousness of the act and consider 
actual or possible harm in completing such rankings). In addition to actual or potential 
harm, the Framework directs EPA staff to consider “importance to the regulatory scheme” 
(that is, the importance of the requirement to achieving the goal of the statute or regulation) 
in determining the gravity component of a penalty. Id. 
 72.  1984 Framework, supra note 68, at app. II.A. The Framework also reflects inten-
tion that EPA staff consider the harm a violation causes to the environment in determining 
the gravity component of a penalty by providing that EPA staff may reduce the gravity 
component of a penalty if the violator “cooperates” by correcting the environmental problem 
prior to litigation. Such cooperation may justify a 50% reduction in the gravity component of 
a penalty. Thus, a violator may be able to reduce its penalty by taking actions to abate or 
redress environmental harm that it has caused, including to an ecosystem and the services 
it provides. Id. at app. I. 
 73.  EPA Comment on SAB Report, supra note 59, at 5. 
 74.  I reviewed EPA’s enforcement or penalty policies for the CWA NPDES program, 
the CWA § 404 program, RCRA, the CAA stationary source program, and EPA’s UST pro-
gram in preparing this article. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED INTERIM CLEAN WATER 
ACT CIVIL PENALTY POLICY (June 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/re-
sources/policies/civil/rcra/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT STA-
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 Beyond this legislative and Agency policy direction that EPA 
staff should consider harm in determining penalty amounts, the 
Agency has identified key rationales for pursuing enforcement that 
support such an approach as well.  EPA has identified three basic 
goals for its enforcement efforts: 1) deterrence, 2) fairness, and 3) 
swift resolution of environmental problems.75  Particularly when 
violations cause significant harm, the theoretical literature sug-
gests that imposing a penalty that incorporates such harm fur-
thers at least the first two of these goals. 
B. Theoretical Support for EPA’s Considering Significant  
Environmental Harm in Determining Penalties 
 There is theoretical support for EPA’s considering harm in im-
posing penalties, particularly for significant violations that cause 
or threaten substantial harm.76  Failure to consider harm ade-
 
TIONARY SOURCE PENALTY POLICY (May 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/penpol.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER 
ACT SECTION 404 SETTLEMENT PENALTY POLICY (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/404pen.pdf.  Federal district court judges are not 
obligated to use these guidance documents. For an example of a court deciding not to use 
the Policy, see Laidlaw, Inc., 956 F.Supp. 588, at 601 (declining, in a citizen suit, to consider 
EPA's March 1995 Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy in calculating an 
appropriate penalty amount). States similarly are not obligated to use them. Some states 
have developed their own policies, but not all. State approaches deserve focused attention, 
particularly since states conduct the vast majority of enforcement. 
 75.  1984 POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56, at 1 (establishing a “single set of 
goals for penalty assessment,” notably “deterrence, fair and equitable treatment of the regu-
lated community, and swift resolution of environmental problems.”). 
 76.  There is a considerable literature on the issue of optimal enforcement. Mark A. 
Cohen, Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a 
Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard, 30 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, 
Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 
23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999). For purposes of this article it is necessary only to make 
the point that enforcement theory supports considering harm in a variety of contexts. To 
provide a very brief and incomplete overview, there are two key types of deterrence, abso-
lute and conditional. As the SAB has put it, society would never condone some offenses — 
like violent assaults and rapes - and these are treated as “unconditionally deterred” of-
fenses. They are to be deterred, regardless of the private benefit to the offender. One 
framework for absolutely deterring violations in the environmental arena is to require the 
violator to disgorge the economic benefit it has gained through its violations. The idea is 
that if a rational economic actor knows that it will be required to disgorge any benefit it 
gains from the violations, it will have no incentive to violate. Economists also recognize, 
however, that this theory of absolute deterrence does not always work in practice, and that 
it may be appropriate to consider harm or other factors to increase the penalty beyond eco-
nomic benefit when the goal is absolute deterrence.   
As the SAB and others have noted, environmental violations may also be treated under 
a framework known as “conditional deterrence.” The notion here is that pollution is usually 
a byproduct of a socially beneficial activity and therefore should be considered to be a “con-
ditionally deterred” offense—one that we only want to prohibit when its overall social costs 
exceed its overall social benefits. Economists suggest that harm is an appropriate basis for 
determining penalties in a context in which the goal is conditional deterrence because under 
this approach a violator’s incentive is to obey the law if the harm it will cause by violating 
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quately in determining penalties may result in under-deterrence 
(i.e., it may result in too high levels of non-compliance), particu-
larly of violations that cause significant harm.  Regulated parties 
are more likely to commit violations that harm the environment 
(and that reduce the services ecosystems provide) when the penal-
ties imposed do not force the violators to internalize the costs of 
such harm.77
 The SAB provides an example to explain why in order to 
achieve appropriate deterrence EPA and other agencies should 
consider the harm a violation causes in determining an appropri-
ate penalty amount, particularly when the harm is significant: 
It is worth emphasizing that this optimal penalty is 
based on the “harm” caused by the offense, not the 
“gain” to the offender.   To take a simple criminal 
example, if a mugger obtained $100 in a robbery and 
the victim ended up spending three days in the hos-
pital, a penalty based on the $100 gain to the of-
fender would surely be too low — and would “under-
deter” such offenses.   The appropriate penalty 
would compensate the victim for three days in the 
hospital and pain and suffering.  In the context of 
environmental offenses, suppose a firm fails to in-
stall a $100 safety valve and as a result 10,000 gal-
lons of crude oil spilled into a sensitive coastal area.   
The $100 “gain” to the offender would certainly not 
be an appropriate starting point for a penalty.   In 
both of these cases, the problem is the failure to take 
account of the harm done to the victim in setting the 
penalty.78
 
will exceed the benefit it will derive by doing so. Under this framework, a penalty based on 
harm creates the proper incentives for behavior in the economics literature. It should be 
noted that, under conditional deterrence theory, if the gain due to noncompliance is large 
relative to the harm, a harm-based penalty will not deter noncompliance, but many econo-
mists are comfortable with this “conditional deterrence” result since, because the gain from 
noncompliance exceeds the harm, noncompliance is actually the overall socially efficient 
outcome. Some environmental violations are considered to be of the “unconditional deter-
rence” variety; thus, while economists might argue that they should be forgiven if the bene-
fit from committing them exceeds the costs, the legislature has answered that question dif-
ferently.  SAB Report, supra note 57, at 25. 
 77.  See SAB report, supra note 57.   Penalty authority carries with it a risk of over-
deterrence as well. This is true, for example, in a case in which a penalty includes an esti-
mate of the harm that is too high.  
 78.  Id. at 25. As noted, supra at note 76, there is an argument that, theoretically, 
penalties that recoup economic benefit should absolutely deter violations.   As the SAB puts 
it, if EPA were in every case to impose a penalty equal to the gain to the offender divided by 
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 The threat of more significant sanctions for violations that 
cause relatively significant harm also may provide what some 
economists have characterized as marginal deterrence.  As 
Polinsky and Shavell put it: 
[E]xpected sanctions influence which harmful acts 
individuals choose to commit.  Notably, such indi-
viduals will have a reason to commit less harmful 
rather than more harmful acts if expected sanctions 
rise with harm.   Deterrence of a more harmful act 
because its expected sanction exceeds that for a less 
harmful act is sometimes referred to as marginal de-
terrence.79    
Polinsky and Shavell conclude that: 
Other things being equal, it is socially desirable that 
enforcement policy creates marginal deterrence, so 
that those who are not deterred from committing 
harmful acts have a reason to moderate the amount 
of harm that they cause.   This suggests that sanc-
tions should rise with the magnitude of harm. . . .    
[M]arginal deterrence is naturally accomplished if 
the expected sanction equals harm for all levels of 
harm; for if a person is paying for harm done, he will 
have to pay appropriately more if he does greater 
harm.”80  
 The SAB suggests that EPA should also consider harm in set-
ting penalties because doing so will lead to more fair results (an-
other policy objective EPA articulates in its enforcement policies): 
An important aspect of fairness is the restoration of 
the status quo: the law has been violated, and one 
 
the probability of detection and punishment, it would never be in the potential offender’s 
interest to violate the law. SAB Report, supra note 57, at 25. But, there are several circum-
stances in which this argument does not hold — e.g., if there is uncertainty as to whether 
EPA will discover a violation, or pursue it, or be successful in determining, and requiring 
the disgorgement of, the entire economic benefit. Id. at 25-26. 
 79.  Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 15, at 63.     
 80.  Id.  “[M]arginal deterrence also can be promoted by increasing the probability of 
detection as well as the magnitude of sanctions.   For example, [as the SAB puts it,] kidnap-
pers can be deterred from killing their victims if greater police resources are devoted to 
apprehending kidnappers who murder their victims than to those who do not.” Id.   This 
point obviously has implications for the allocation of resources to, and design of, EPA in-
spection and monitoring schemes and their effectiveness in uncovering violations that 
threaten or cause significant harm to ecosystems and their services. 
Spring, 2007]  THINKING INSIDE THE BOX 569 
 
                                                                                                                  
objective of the penalty system is to return to the 
status quo before the violation occurred. . . . 
[R]emoving the economic benefit is not the only ac-
tion that might be required in order to restore the 
status quo. With a violation of an environmental 
regulation, there is a loss resulting from the pol-
luter’s action in the form of some harm to the natu-
ral environment. Whether the natural resource that 
is harmed belongs to a private individual or the gen-
eral public, restoration of the status quo can call for 
some appropriate compensatory action, perhaps in 
the form of a penalty based on harm to the environ-
ment rather than on gain to the polluter.81    
 To sum up, it appears to be undisputed that Congressional and 
Agency policies direct Agency staff to consider environmental 
harm (actual and potential) in determining penalty amounts.  
There also appears to be theoretical support for EPA to pursue 
such approaches.  Thus, the major remaining questions involve the 
extent to which EPA is, in fact, considering harm, including harm 
to ecosystem services, in determining penalty amounts and, re-
 
 81.  SAB Report, supra note 57, at 1. The SAB characterizes as “the major focus” of 
EPA’s penalty policy the fairness notion that the “restorative objective of a penalty system is 
to undo the violation and return the situation to how it was before the violation occurred.” 
Id. at 9.   The SAB notes that restoring the status quo requires not only disgorging the un-
warranted gain to the violator, but also making good on the “unwarranted loss” to some 
other party.   The SAB notes that a compensatory action could include both clean-up and 
some form of environmental restoration. “The costs of clean-up and environmental restora-
tion are thus compensation that should be paid by the polluter in order to restore the status 
quo.” Id. 
The SAB elaborates on this issue as follows: 
 
In summary, the restoration of the status quo would appear to be an im-
portant aspect of the fairness objective in setting the penalty for a viola-
tion of an environmental regulation. This restorative goal can be seen to 
have two possible implications. If one focuses on the polluter’s unlawful 
gain, restoration of the status quo implies that he should give up the 
gain. If one focuses on the unlawful harm to the environment, restora-
tion of the status quo implies that he should pay an amount covering the 
cost of cleanup and/or environmental restoration. In general, there is no 
reason to expect that the two different approaches will lead to a similar 
assessment of a monetary payment: the cost avoided by failing to control 
pollution need bear no relationship to the damage caused by the pollu-
tion. This raises two questions: Which approach is presently adopted by 
the EPA? Which approach seems preferable, or should they be combined 
in some manner? 
 
With regard to the first question, . . . the current EPA penalty policy . . . contain[s] 
some elements of both approaches. . . .    
 
Id. at 9-10.   
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lated, the challenges associated with its doing so.  It is to these 
questions that I now turn briefly in the following section. 
C. EPA’s Experience in Assessing Environmental Harm in  
Determining Penalties and its Challenges in Doing So 
 A recent SAB report suggests the possibility of a significant 
gap between the Congressional and Agency policy direction (dis-
cussed in Section III.A) and the theory supporting considering 
harm (discussed in Section III.B), and the reality on the ground.  
The SAB report indicates that the reality in the penalty calcula-
tion context is that, despite the direction in the generic and media-
specific agency policies, EPA has traditionally focused much of its 
penalty calculation efforts on the first prong in the Agency’s pen-
alty calculation methodology, determining economic benefit, and it 
has paid little attention to harm.82  After spending almost two 
years reviewing EPA’s approach to calculating penalties,83 the 
SAB noted that EPA devotes much more effort to determining and 
recouping economic benefit than it pays to determining and 
monetizing environmental harm as part of its gravity analysis.  
“[T]he current EPA penalty process appears to focus overwhelm-
ingly on the calculation of the unlawful gain to the polluter, with 
no systematic consideration of the monetary value of the environ-
mental damage caused by the violation….”84  Along the same lines, 
the SAB concluded that “[s]ince 1978, the EPA has made the viola-
tor’s economic benefit from . . . violating the Clean Air and Clean 
Water Acts the centerpiece of its calculation of civil penalties.” 85  
In its comments on the SAB report, EPA acknowledges this is the 
case.86   
 The SAB has concluded that it is feasible for EPA to calculate 
harm, and has recommended that EPA embark on such an effort, 
but EPA has not embraced this recommendation with open arms.  
The SAB offers the following advice in its cover letter to the 2005 
report: “The Panel believes that the state-of-the art in benefits es-
timation has progressed to the point where EPA should seriously 
explore how it might incorporate ‘harm-based’ measures into its 
 
 82.  SAB Report, supra note 57, at 10.  
 83.  Mike Ferullo, Panel Says EPA Penalty Assessment Process Should Tally Value of 
Environmental Harm, BNA DAILY ENV’T REPORT, Sept. 21, 2005, at A-8. 
 84.  SAB Report, supra note 57, at 9-10.  See also id. at 7 (asserting that, “[s]ince 
1978, the EPA has based civil penalties under the CAA and CWA on the violator’s economic 
benefit from noncompliance from violating the law.”).  
 85.  Id. at 1.  
 86.  EPA Comment on SAB Report, supra note 59.  
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penalty formula. . . . ”87  On the other hand, EPA points to various 
constraints as an explanation for its limited consideration of harm: 
“even when the harm can in theory be monetized, in almost all 
civil penalty actions the analytical resources and efforts necessary 
to accomplish this could be very substantial.”88
 The SAB’s optimism, coupled with EPA’s identification of road-
blocks, suggests the possible value of more in-depth assessment of 
the possibilities for developing greater agency capacity to integrate 
harm-based evaluations into its penalty calculation methodologies.  
Little such in-depth assessment has been done to date.  Thus, my 
main purpose in this section is to suggest the beginnings of a fu-
ture research agenda to develop a better understanding of current 
practices, and future challenges and opportunities.  Questions that 
deserve attention include: 1) How often does EPA consider harm, 
including harm to ecosystem services?; 2) What motivates the 
Agency to consider harm in some cases and not in others?; 3) How 
does EPA carry out such efforts?; 4) Are there significant regional 
variations in the answers to these questions; and 5) To the extent 
there is a gap between theory and policy directives, on the one 
hand, and implementation on the other, what are the practical 
constraints or other factors that may account for this gap, and are 
there ways EPA can overcome these constraints so the Agency is 
able to consider harm to ecosystem services more than it does cur-
rently?  The answers to these questions will help to inform consid-
eration of the extent to which, and possible ways in which, EPA 
can and should pay more attention to the harm (and potential 
harm) a violation causes in determining the appropriate penalty. 
 A final observation is that EPA’s penalty calculation authori-
ties provide it with a forum for promoting learning about ecosys-
tem services.  The ecosystem services literature is full of references 
to data limitations.89  To name three, there are significant limits to 
our knowledge about: 1) baseline conditions — the current state of 
the environment and the services it provides; 2) impacts — the ex-
tent to which different types of environmental insults cause harm 
to different types of ecosystems; and 3) valuation — the dollar 
 
 87.  Letter from Dr. A. Myrick Freeman III, Chair, Illegal Competitive Advantage 
(ICA) Economic Benefit (EB) Advisory Panel, EPA Science Advisory Board, to Stephen L. 
Johnson, EPA Administrator (Sept. 7, 2005) (on file with the author). See also SAB Report, 
supra note 57, at 5, 26. In concluding that benefits estimation is feasible in some cases, the 
SAB notes that “there is some continuing disagreement about the relative merits of alterna-
tive approaches and their overall reliability.” Id. at 26. 
 88.  Id. at 4. EPA also indicates that “[w]hile the Agency’s penalty policies do consider 
the environmental harm from the violations (when present),” it asserts that “the violations 
EPA prosecutes rarely involve provable environmental damage.” Id.     
 89.  See e.g., supra note 19. 
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value of the level of harm particular violations cause.  EPA has the 
opportunity to advance learning in all three of these areas as part 
of its efforts to calculate penalties.  To provide one example, if a 
violation harms a particular wetland, EPA has the authority, in 
determining an appropriate penalty, to gather data on the natural 
environment involved (e.g., the qualities of the wetland and the 
services the wetland provides); it has authority to gather data on 
the nature and extent of the harm that the violation caused to the 
wetland and the services it provides; and the Agency has the au-
thority to calculate, and place, a monetary value on this harm.  
EPA can use these types of data-gathering and valuation efforts to 
learn more about the particular resources involved.  It also can in-
corporate this knowledge and expertise on a broader scale, to bol-
ster our knowledge of natural inventories by improving our under-
standing of baseline conditions and services.  Thus, in short, learn-
ing the Agency derives from calculating a “harm-based” penalty for 
one set of violations may provide information that will facilitate 
understanding, protecting, and restoring ecosystems and the ser-
vices they provide in a range of contexts. 
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 As noted above, EPA’s enforcement authorities include the au-
thority to impose injunctive relief, in addition to the power to im-
pose penalties.  In at least some circumstances, EPA has defined 
the scope of its injunctive authority to include the power to require 
violators to cease violations and to repair any harm the violations 
have caused.  EPA has noted, for example, that “[i]n settling en-
forcement actions, EPA requires alleged violators to promptly 
cease the violations and, to the extent feasible, remediate any 
harm caused by the violations.”90
 EPA’s injunctive authorities appear to give it significant oppor-
tunities to protect ecosystems and the services they provide, in at 
least three ways.  Most obviously, if a violation is causing harm to 
an ecosystem or threatening to do so, EPA can enjoin the violator 
to change its behavior by terminating the activities that are caus-
ing or threatening harm and to take steps to minimize the pros-
pects for recurrence.  There are limitations on EPA’s authority, in-
cluding courts’ having the equitable discretion to determine appro-
priate relief in particular cases and thereby override EPA’s pre-
ferred approach.91  Nevertheless, in broad terms EPA has long as-
 
 90.  Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 
24796, 24796 (May 5, 1998) [hereinafter Final SEPs Policy].  
 91.  Courts generally have extraordinarily broad equitable authority to “do justice” in 
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serted the power to require violators to cease their violations and 
return to compliance.92
 Second, as indicated in the initial paragraph in this section, in 
at least some cases EPA asserts that its injunctive authorities em-
power it to enjoin a violator to act affirmatively to address harm 
that it has caused.  Professor Edward Lloyd and others have sug-
gested limits to this authority. 93  In many cases, however, EPA 
has negotiated agreements that obligated alleged violators to 
remediate harm their violations have caused, and in others courts 
or EPA’s judges or Environmental Appeals Board have required 
violators to do so. 
 Finally, EPA’s injunctive authorities appear to give it signifi-
cant capacity for learning that will promote protection of ecosys-
tems and the services they provide by advancing understanding of 
ecosystems and these services.  As noted above, the ecosystem ser-
vices literature identifies significant data-related shortcomings to 
our ability to protect and restore ecosystems.  These include limits 
in our understanding of: 1) baseline conditions — the current state 
of the environment and the services it provides; 2) impacts — the 
extent to which different types of environmental insults cause 
harm to different types of ecosystems and, related, the impact of 
these harms on the capacity of ecosystems to provide services such 
as pollination, flood control, and the like; and 3) the efficacy and 
cost of different approaches to protecting and restoring ecosystems 
and the services they provide.  EPA has the opportunity to use its 
injunctive authorities to advance learning in all three of these ar-
eas.  To use the same example discussed above, if a violation 
harms a wetland, EPA claims the authority, in determining appro-
priate injunctive relief, to: 1) gather data on the qualities of the 
wetland and on the services the wetland provides; 2) develop in-
 
resolving cases involving violations of the environmental laws. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Ro-
mero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (indicating that the CWA “permits the district court 
to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act”); cf. 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). (holding that Congress had limited 
the courts’ traditionally broad equitable jurisdiction). EPA also has broad enforcement dis-
cretion to decide whether to prosecute, how to prosecute, and whether to settle a case. See 
e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (an agency’s discretion not to enforce is gener-
ally committed to the agency’s absolute discretion); Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Comm’sn, 671 F.2d 643, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (EPA’s 
enforcement discretion includes the discretion to settle a case). 
 92.  1984 EPA POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 56. 
 93.  Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used 
in Citizen Suits to Deter Future Violations as Well as to Achieve Significant Additional En-
vironmental Benefits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 425 (2004) (discussing amendments pro-
posed to the CWA in 1993, which would have authorized courts to order a violator to restore 
the natural resources damaged or destroyed as the result of the violation at issue, S. 1114, 
103rd Cong. 262 (1993), and asking why such amendments were needed if courts already 
have this authority). 
574  JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 22.2 
 
                                                                                                                  
formation on the nature and extent of the harm that the violation 
caused to the wetland and the services it provides; and 3) require 
the violator to cease the violation that is causing harm (and to 
identify and evaluate different options for doing so) and to abate 
the harm that it has caused (again, after identifying and evaluat-
ing different options for doing so). 
 While the same types of barriers to EPA’s pursuing more harm-
based penalty calculations exist in the injunctive relief context, 
such as resource constraints, methodological challenges, and the 
like, the fact that EPA has the ability in some cases to direct the 
violators to do the basic investigatory and remedial or restorative 
work means that EPA can reduce these barriers by shifting much 
of the work to the violators rather than undertake this work itself.  
While EPA needs to maintain the capacity to direct and oversee a 
violator’s work, the resource demands should be less than if EPA 
were doing the work itself.  Further, the economic valuation work 
will be in much less demand on the injunctive end of the relief 
spectrum, thereby simplifying EPA’s methodological challenges in 
justifying commitments from violators. 
 Another point worth mentioning concerning the promise of 
EPA’s injunctive authority as a tool to protect ecosystems is that 
EPA has structured its enforcement policies to create leverage for 
its efforts to have violators undertake needed remedial work.  
EPA’s Framework allows Agency staff to reduce the gravity com-
ponent of a penalty significantly if the violator “cooperates” by cor-
recting the environmental problem prior to litigation.94  This ap-
proach obviously creates an incentive for violators to reach agree-
ment with EPA on appropriate injunctive actions to abate and/or 
redress environmental harm that they have caused, including to 
an ecosystem and the services it provides, so that the violators 
may reduce their penalty by taking such actions. 
V. SEPS 
 EPA has coined the acronym SEPs (shorthand for Supplemen-
tal Environmental Projects) to refer to a third type of enforcement-
related relief that holds promise for advancing knowledge of eco-
systems and the services they provide, and for protecting, restor-
ing, and enhancing such services.  This Part examines the poten-
 
 94.  1984 Framework, supra note 68; See also Catskill Mountains Chap. of Trout v. 
City of NY, 244 F.Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (reducing penalty because of mitigation ef-
forts). More generally, the Clean Water Act’s direction that courts consider a defendant’s 
good faith effort to comply in assessing a penalty similarly indicates that efforts to comply 
can help to mitigate a penalty. Laidlaw, Inc.,  956 F.Supp. at 607-8.  
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tial for SEPs to serve as a useful form of relief for improving pro-
tection of ecosystem services.95
 Commentators who have lauded the promise of SEPs as a 
mechanism for enhancing environmental protection, including pro-
tecting ecosystems and the services they provide, have tended to 
highlight two key features of SEPs.96  SEPs are in a sense “envi-
ronmental freebies” — projects that will have a positive environ-
mental impact that would not be undertaken otherwise.97  Fur-
ther, EPA’s enforcement policies create leverage for EPA to per-
suade violators to undertake environmentally beneficial SEPs they 
are not legally obligated to undertake, including the possibility 
that EPA may reduce the penalty it will impose on a violator in 
exchange for the party’s undertaking a SEP. 98
 
 95.  While I focus on EPA’s SEPs policies and practices, states’ interest in SEPs ap-
pears to have increased as well.  A 2005 survey of State SEP approaches found that 30 
states have adopted formal, published SEP policies, up from 19 eight years before.  Steven 
Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 188 
(2005). Another 13 states also negotiate SEPs, but do so based on informal, unwritten prac-
tices. Id. Only two states, North Carolina and South Carolina have rejected SEPs. Id. 
 96.  See David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits Of Environmental Enforcement Reform: 
The Case Of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, 1181-83; Ken-
neth T. Kristl, Making a Good Idea Even Better: Rethinking the Limits on Supplemental 
Environmental Projects, 31 VT. L. REV. 217 (2007); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413-4.  Cf. Bon-
orris et al., supra note 95, at 221  (suggesting that SEPs’ potential value extends beyond 
providing environmental benefits in particular settlements to “hold[ing] the promise of a re-
invented regulatory model, one of cooperative enforcement, rather than the procrustean 
standard of traditional top-down, ‘command and control’ regulation.”).    
 97.  For favorable characterizations of SEPs, see, e.g., Dana, supra note 96, at 1205 
(noting that several commentators and others have referred to SEPs as “win-win” opportu-
nities); Laurie Droughton, Comment, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargain for 
the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789, 789 (1995) (referring to SEPs as a “bargain 
for the environment”); Kristl, supra note 96, at 1 (characterizing a SEP as a “win-win” 
proposition because the plaintiff “achieves both prevention and restoration,” the defendant 
reduces its penalty, and the environment benefits); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413 (concluding 
that “[t]he use of citizen suit SEPs is widespread and largely successful.”).  For expressions 
of concern about SEPs, see generally, Michael Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990); Dana, supra note 96, at 1184, 1215, 1216 (suggest-
ing that SEPs may lower the cost of violating the environmental laws and thereby result in 
undeterrence of such violations, and that, ultimately, SEPs are “an unattractive vehicle to 
promote environmental good works” and suggesting that there are alternative means avail-
able for the government to promote environmental good works that do not undermine deter-
rence objectives — namely, government grants to regulated entities for such projects).  
 98.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24803 (noting that “the enforcement context 
has two distinct advantages. First, firms can be motivated to innovate . . . through penalty 
reduction, improved relations with the Agency, and improved public relations. Second, since 
the firm has committed to implement the innovative project in its consent agreement with 
the Agency . . . there is a strong incentive to stick with the project even when technical diffi-
culties arise. Enforcement thus creates a ‘window of opportunity’ in which options for tech-
nological change receive more serious consideration than usual.”).   Defendants have other 
possible reasons for agreeing to SEPs as well. See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environ-
mental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 81, 87 (2002) (noting that industry groups and regulators have supported SEPs on the 
grounds that they avoid or reduce litigation costs, foster fairness for regulated parties, and 
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 EPA has had considerable experience with SEPs.  The Agency 
issued its Final SEPs Policy in 1998,99 but the Agency had been 
entering into SEPs for approximately twenty years prior to its is-
suance of the 1998 Policy.100  The Agency has continued to give 
SEPs substantial policy attention; it has issued at least 17 guid-
ance memoranda on SEPs since 1998.101
 The Agency’s rhetoric has generally been quite supportive of 
SEPs.  In its 1998 Final SEPs Policy, EPA announced that it 
“placed a high priority” on including SEPs in settlements.102  EPA 
has issued a series of post-1998 refinements to its SEPs Policy in 
order to “help promote the use of SEPs in enforcement settle-
ments.”103  It has, for example, taken steps to simplify the process 
for approval of SEPs and to increase incentives for violators to 
agree to SEPs.104  In a 2002 Memorandum, the Agency stated that 
 
“increase popular support.” They also may engender a greater degree of cooperation among 
regulators, regulated parties, and interested citizens.)  Professor David Dana identifies a 
variety of reasons why regulators may be favorably disposed to SEPs. Dana, supra note 96, 
at 1200-1 (suggesting that regulators may generate political backing from local residents 
and that this increased local goodwill may produce more resources.  Further, “[i]ncreased 
local goodwill may translate into purely psychic benefits for regulators.  [R]egulators may 
experience psychic satisfaction in witnessing an environmental improvement that results 
directly from their efforts.”  Regulators may find it beneficial to use SEPs as a learning op-
portunity or as a “testing ground” for future regulatory programs.). Dana also suggests that 
SEPs may be beneficial by engendering greater internalization of “the norms of good envi-
ronmental citizenship” and therefore lead to increased compliance. Id. at 1211.   For general 
reasons why defendants might opt to settle a case rather than litigate it, such as the cost of 
litigation and the risks inherent in litigation, see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfield, 
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 27, pp. 1067-97 
(1989) (providing survey results).   
 99.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90.     
 100.  Id. For two recent, detailed historical reviews of EPA’s development and use of 
SEPs, see generally, Kristl, supra note 96; Lloyd, supra note 93. Citizens negotiate SEPs in 
settling enforcement cases as well. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413 (noting that the 
“use of citizen suit SEPs is widespread and largely successful”); Greve, supra note 97.  
 101.  EPA provides a list of its SEPs Policy and Guidance online. SEPs Policy and 
Guidance, http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps (last visited Aug. 18, 
2007). They cover the availability of SEPs in a wide range of enforcement contexts (for ex-
ample, settlements with municipalities of CWA enforcement case, green buildings, retrofit-
ting school buses, etc.). See also Memorandum from Phyllis Harris, Principal Deputy Asst. 
Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Adm’rs, Clarification and Expansion of Environmental Compli-
ance Audits under the Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (Jan. 10, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepauditclar-mem.pdf 
(advising that EPA is expanding the environmental compliance audit category of SEPs) and  
Kristl, supra note 96, at 17.    
 102.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24796. 
 103.  Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Asst. Adm’rs 
et al., Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects 3 (June 11, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-expandinguse.pdf 
[hereinafter Suarez, Expanding Use]. 
 104.  Id.  In addition, EPA has included a project idea form on its website; it develops a 
project ideas memorandum that it updates and sends out regularly; and it provides SEP 
information on the Enforcement and Compliance History Online system (www.epa.gov/ 
echo).  E-mail from Beth Cavalier, Special Litigation and Project Division, EPA OECA, to 
author (Feb. 28, 2007, 07:21:00 EST) (on file with the author). 
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“SEPs are an important part of the settlement process and are an 
appropriate means to further Agency enforcement goals and objec-
tives.  We encourage the Regions to continue to promote SEPs and 
look for opportunities to incorporate such projects into their set-
tlements.”105  Echoing the Agency’s rhetoric, Professor David Dana 
suggested in a 1998 article that “the use of SEPs by public regula-
tors . . . soon will become (or arguably already has become) a major 
component of environmental enforcement.”106
 In light of the internal and external optimism about SEPs and 
support for them, EPA’s track record in negotiating SEPs might 
come as a bit of a surprise.  The use of SEPs has not increased 
substantially, as one might expect from EPA’s rhetoric.107  Instead, 
as the Annual Results data above reflects, in EPA’s FY 2001, EPA 
estimated the value of the SEPs it entered into that year to be 
about $90 million, while over the past four years, the value of 
SEPs has declined to amounts in the range of $45-$65 million an-
nually.108  Data that Professor Kenneth Kristl has compiled indi-
cates that the number of SEPs has not increased in recent years 
either.109
 The rest of this Part reviews key features of SEPs.  It concludes 
by identifying, and briefly exploring, several possible strategies for 
expanding use of SEPs beyond historic and current levels. 
A. Definitions: What are SEPs? 
 As EPA explains, SEPs have a unique role in EPA’s enforce-
ment tool box.  They are intended to “obtain environmental and 
public health protection and improvements that may not otherwise 
 
 105.  Memorandum from Sylvia Lowrence, Acting Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Regl. 
Adm’rs, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Policy, (Mar. 22, 2002), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/sepguide-mem.pdf [hereinafter 
Lowrence, 2002 SEPs Memo].  
 106.  Dana, supra note 96, at 1181 n.1. 
 107.  See Dana, supra note 96, at 1181 (anticipating a significant increase in SEPs). 
 108.  Id.. While David Dana reported in 1998 that the dollar value of SEPs in FY 1995 
substantially exceeded the value of civil and administrative penalties that EPA assessed 
($103,840,773 vs. approximately $70 million), in 1996, SEPs declined to $65 million, while 
civil and administrative penalties increased to more than $96 million.  Dana, supra note 96, 
at 1189.   The Annual Results, supra note 27, at 5, which brings these figures up to date for 
the past five years, reflects that while the ratio of the value of SEPs to the value of civil 
penalties was relatively stable from 2001-2003, at about 65-70% (2001 = 71%, or 89/126; 
2002=64%, or 58/90; and 2003 = 68%, or 65/96), there has been a dramatic drop-off in SEPs 
the past two years.  In 2004, the ratio is only 32%, $48 million SEPs/$149 million civil pen-
alties; and in 2005 the ratio was 37%, $57 million/$154 million. Professor Kenneth Kristl 
has compiled information on the numbers of SEPs negotiated over the past several years. 
See Kristl, supra note 96.    
 109.  See Kristl, supra note 96. 
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have occurred . . . .” 110  In this way they complement EPA’s tradi-
tional injunctive authority to require violators to cease violations 
and remediate any harm the violations have caused.111
 EPA has established three threshold criteria for consideration 
of a project as a SEP.  First, the project must be “environmentally 
beneficial.” EPA explains that “environmentally beneficial” means 
a “SEP must improve, protect, or reduce risks to public health, or 
the environment at large.”112
 Second, the violator must not be legally obligated to perform 
the project that it will undertake as a SEP.  EPA notes that, for 
example, “if a court is likely to order a defendant to perform a spe-
cific activity in a particular case, such an activity does not qualify 
as a SEP.”113
 Third, the alleged violator must commit to perform the project 
as part of a settlement of an enforcement action.114  SEPs are 
available only in the enforcement arena; they are not available as 
part of EPA’s regulatory process (for example, as permit conditions 
EPA includes in authorizing a facility to operate under one or more 
environmental laws) or through EPA’s exercise of its rulemaking 
authorities.  Further, in the enforcement arena, EPA only pursues 
SEPs in settlements, not as relief in litigated cases.115
B. Additional Requirements for and Features of SEPs 
 EPA has established additional requirements for approval of 
SEPs, directing that its staff use a four-step process in considering 
a possible SEP project, after ensuring that the project meets the 
definition of a SEP: 1) the project must  satisfy all legal guidelines 
(including “nexus”); 2) it must fit within a designated category of 
SEPs; 3) EPA staff must determine the appropriate amount of 
penalty mitigation; and 4) EPA staff must ensure that a project 
satisfies various implementation and other criteria.116  This sec-
 
 110.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24796 (emphasis added).  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 24798.   
 113.  EPA notes that “[t]he statutes EPA administers generally provide a court with 
broad authority to order a defendant to cease its violations, take necessary steps to prevent 
future violations, and to remediate any harm caused by the violations.” Final SEPs Policy, 
supra note 90, at 24798 n.3. EPA continues: “[i]f a court is likely to order a defendant to 
perform a specific activity in a particular case, such an activity does not qualify as a SEP.” 
Id.   
 114.  Id. at 24797 (noting that “[t]his is a settlement policy and thus is not intended for 
use by . . . courts. . . .”). Some commentators have suggested that courts retain the equitable 
discretion to require SEPs. Kristl, supra note 96, at 15.    
 115.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24797-98. 
 116.  Id. at 24797. 
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tion briefly reviews each of these steps.117
1.  Legal Guidelines118
 SEPs raise at least two threshold legal questions: 1) whether 
EPA has the legal authority to negotiate commitments to perform 
environmentally beneficial work that it cannot require a defendant 
to undertake; and 2) whether EPA has the authority to reduce the 
size of a penalty in exchange for such a commitment? 
 The short answer is that for the past twenty-plus years, EPA 
has answered each of these questions in the affirmative, in its 
various SEPs policies and elsewhere.  The Agency has consistently 
claimed that it has authority to negotiate commitments for work 
that it lacks legal power to impose or require; and, further, the 
Agency has the ability to offer reduced penalties in exchange for 
such commitments.119
 The Agency has, however, established certain “legal guidelines” 
to bolster its legal position that SEPs are defensible, including re-
quiring a “nexus” between a proposed project and the violations at 
issue.120  In its 1998 SEPs Policy, EPA indicates that the requisite 
 
 117.  For more extensive treatment, see generally Lloyd, supra note 93; Kristl, supra 
note 96; Dana, supra note 96. 
 118.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24798-99.  
 119.  EPA’s lawyers and others claim that EPA has the authority to enter into SEPs 
that commit alleged violators to take action that EPA could not order the violators to under-
take because the SEPs are the result of negotiations and, as a result, they are projects the 
violator has entered into willingly.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 247897-98. I do not 
address the merits of this issue in this article. For legal analyses of EPA’s authority, see for 
example, Kristl, supra note 96, at 24-34; Dana, supra note 96, at 1182-1184 (suggesting that 
“[t]he only serious controversy regarding SEPs has concerned their statutory basis,” and 
summarizing some of the arguments pro and con); Lloyd, supra note 93, at 413-15 (conclud-
ing that “[b]oth the courts and Congress have accepted, if not actively encouraged, SEPs 
either by affirmative approvals or passive acceptance” and that EPA has “adopted SEPs as a 
major component of its own enforcement regime.”) (Professor Lloyd acknowledges that he is 
an attorney with Columbia’s law clinic, has brought several citizen suits that included 
SEPs, and is a strong advocate for SEPs); and Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 198, 199 
(“courts have upheld the legality of consent decrees that go beyond the express relief out-
lined in a statute, with the proviso that the decrees are consistent with the underlying pur-
pose of the statute.”).    
EPA, and the U.S. government through the Department of Justice, have opposed SEPs 
in citizen suits in some cases.   Lloyd, supra note 93, at 430 (suggesting that EPA and DOJ 
have “kept a watchful eye” on settlements of citizen suits).   Lloyd notes that courts “ordi-
narily” have entered proposed consent decrees resolving citizen suits with a SEP compo-
nent, even over EPA and DOJ objections. Id. 
 120.  See e.g., Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103. 
 
To ensure that the Agency’s enforcement discretion is used appropriately 
and in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and the MRA, all SEPs 
must satisfy several key elements.   To be approved as a SEP, a project 
must: 1) Be related to or have a “nexus” to the underlying violation; 2) 
Provide significant environmental and public health benefits; 3) Benefit 
the community affected by the violation; and 4) Secure public health 
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relationship between a project and a violation may exist in any of 
three ways: 1) the project will reduce the likelihood that similar 
violations will occur in the future; 2) the project will reduce the ad-
verse impact to public health or the environment to which the vio-
lation at issue contributes; or 3) the project will reduce the overall 
risk to public health or the environment potentially affected by the 
violation at issue.121
 This broad definition of SEPs seemingly would include a sig-
nificant number of projects that have the potential to improve the 
environment.  For example, under the third type of nexus, a SEP 
project would seem to have adequate nexus if the project operates 
to protect or enhance a part of the environment if a violation poses 
a risk to that  part of the environment, such as a particular ecosys-
tem.  There is some suggestion that EPA is prepared to define 
“nexus” even more broadly than that.   EPA’s SEPs Policy contin-
ues that “[n]exus is easier to establish if the primary impact of the 
project is . . . in the same ecosystem or within the immediate geo-
graphic area.”122  Implicit in this is that a SEP is approvable even 
 
and/or environmental improvements beyond what can be achieved under 
applicable environmental laws.    
 
Id. at 2.  Not all commentators agree that nexus is needed. See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96.    
EPA has established other limitations on SEPs as well.   For example, the Final SEPs Policy 
indicated that SEPs may not be profitable to a defendant.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, 
at 24798. EPA modified this policy in 2003, issuing a memorandum that EPA may accept 
SEPs that prove profitable to a defendant in some cases. Memorandum from John Peter 
Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Counsel et al., Guidance for Determining Whether 
a Project is Profitable, When to Accept Profitable Projects as Supplemental Environmental 
Projects, and How to Value Such Projects (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-profitableprojects.pdf. 
 121.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90,  at 24798.   The other four “legal guidelines” 
that EPA identifies in its Policy appear to limit the availability of SEPs in ways that might 
limit SEPs for ecosystem services in some contexts, but by no means all.   Thus, a project 
cannot be “inconsistent with any provision of the underlying statute;” EPA cannot play a 
role in managing or controlling funds for the SEP or manage the SEP, but it can oversee it; 
the settlement agreement must provide sufficient detail concerning the project; and EPA 
cannot use a project to meet its statutory obligations or another agency’s obligations. Id. at 
24798. EPA’s Lowrence, 2002 SEPs Memo, supra note 105, reiterates these elements of the 
Policy.   The 2002 SEPs Memo also lists other restrictions: 
 
7) A project may not provide EPA . . . with additional resources to per-
form a particular activity for which Congress has specifically appropri-
ated funds.  
8) A project may not provide additional resources to support specific ac-
tivities performed by EPA employees or EPA contractors.  
9) A project may not provide a federal grantee with additional funds to 
perform a specific task identified within an assistance agreement.  
10) Projects that involve only contributions to a charitable or civic or-
ganization are not acceptable. 
 
Id. at 2.    
 122.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24798.    
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if it may benefit other ecosystems or other geographic areas; pre-
sumably, in some cases, even if its primary impact is to do so.123
 In sum, EPA’s definition of “nexus” in its 1998 Policy appears 
to create the potential for a broad range of SEPs that could protect 
ecosystems and the services they provide.124  A 2002 Memorandum 
from EPA’s Director of Office of Regulatory Enforcement that fo-
cused on the “nexus” requirement indicates that “[i]n most cases, 
nexus is not difficult to establish.”125
 Further, as one commentator has noted, EPA’s “consistent 
theme” in its post-1998 SEPs Policies has been to encourage 
Agency staff to expand their use of SEPs.126  In a June 2003 memo-
randum, aptly entitled Expanding the Use of Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects, for example, EPA’s then head of enforcement 
urged agency staff to “consider every opportunity to increase our 
use of SEPs and include more environmentally significant SEPs 
whenever possible.”127  The memorandum indicates that during FY 
2002, 10 percent of EPA’s civil penalty settlements included a SEP, 
but urged that, while EPA “should be proud of these figures,” “we 
have a tremendous opportunity to achieve greater benefits for the 
environment and communities affected by violations.”128  In a De-
cember 15, 2003 Guidance, EPA’s enforcement head identified op-
portunities to expand the universe of potential SEPs.  He indicated 
that EPA staff may, in certain circumstances, aggregate SEPs in 
multiple cases (e.g., EPA may allow regulated parties to pool re-
 
 123.  For example, EPA officials indicated that if a violation occurs in a tributary or 
stream of a larger river; the SEP may take place in a different part of the river to improve 
the overall quality of the river as a whole.  E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104. On 
the other hand, in an October 2002 memorandum, EPA suggests that “geography alone does 
not create nexus.   The mere fact that a SEP is beneficial to an area near a facility does not 
by itself satisfy the nexus requirement.   Enforcement staff must be able to demonstrate 
how the project relates to the violations that are the subject of the enforcement action.”  
Memorandum from Walker Smith, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, to Reg’l Counsel, 
Importance of the Nexus Requirement in the Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy 2 
(Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/ 
sepnexus-mem.pdf  [hereinafter Smith, Importance of the Nexus]. (ORE is now called the 
Office of Civil Enforcement.)  Thus, while geography does not appear to be necessary in all 
cases to establish nexus, it is also not necessarily sufficient to do so.  Kristl, supra note 96.    
 124.  See Dana, supra note 96, at 1186 (noting that the SEPs policy defines nexus 
broadly). 
 125.  Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 1.  Also see infra notes 168-
179 and accompanying text. 
 126.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 18. 
 127.  Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 1; see also Memorandum from John 
Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Reg’l Counsels et al., Guidance Concerning the 
Use of Third Parties in the Performance of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) 
and the Aggregation of SEP Funds (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compli-
ance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-thirdparties.pdf [hereinafter Suarez, 2003 Guidance].  
 128.  Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 1; see also Suarez, 2003 Guidance, 
supra note 127 (to the same effect). 
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sources to implement a consolidated SEP), noting that aggregation 
“could provide increased leverage and allow for projects with a 
greater environmental or public health benefit. . . .”129  Similarly, 
he indicated that in some circumstances EPA staff may negotiate 
“complementary, segregable SEPs” with defendants in different 
cases that are, for example, interested in performing “discrete and 
segregable tasks within a larger project.”130  Such projects “can re-
sult in a significant environmental or public health benefit that 
might otherwise be unavailable.”131
 Specific categories of projects EPA has identified as suitable for 
SEPs reinforce the message embodied in the rhetoric summarized 
in this section, notably that EPA’s approach to SEPs appear to 
make them well-suited for ecosystems protection-related projects. 
2.  Specific Categories of Projects 
 EPA lists seven specific categories of projects that may qualify 
as SEPs.  This list provides strong evidence that EPA is prepared 
to approve SEPs that have significant potential to protect ecosys-
tems and the services they provide.132  For example, EPA’s fourth 
category of permissible SEPs, entitled “Environmental Restoration 
and Protection,” refers explicitly to projects “which enhance[ ] the 
condition of the ecosystem or immediate geographic area adversely 
affected.”133  The Agency continues: “These projects may be used to 
restore or protect natural environments (such as ecosystems). . . .  
This category also includes any project which protects the ecosys-
tem from actual or potential damage resulting from the violation 
or improves the overall condition of the ecosystem.”134  EPA lists 
“[restoration of] a wetland in the same ecosystem . . . in which the 
 
 129.  Suarez, 2003 Guidance, supra note 127, at 2. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.  On the other hand, then Enforcement head Suarez indicates that EPA’s OGC 
vetoed the idea of aggregating SEP funds because of concerns that doing so would raise 
questions under the MRA. “A cash payment, such as a payment . . . to a SEP ‘bank,’ where 
there is no further responsibility for the defendant . . . to ensure that a specific project is 
completed, is prohibited because it could easily be construed as a diversion from the Treas-
ury of penalties due and owing the government.” Id. at 3.  Suarez indicates that defendants 
may hire third parties to assist with SEPs, so long as the defendant retains full responsibil-
ity for the SEP. A defendant may not negotiate a SEP that involves making a cash payment 
to a third party to conduct the SEP without the defendant’s retraining full responsibility. Id. 
at 4.    
 132.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799-24800; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA 325-R-01001, BEYOND COM-
PLIANCE: SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS, at 4-5, (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter BE-
YOND COMPLIANCE]. 
 133.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799. 
 134.  Id. 
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facility is located” as one such project.135  The Agency also lists as a 
permissible project the “purchase and management of a watershed 
area by the defendant/respondent to protect a drinking water sup-
ply where the violation (e.g., a reporting violation) did not directly 
damage the watershed but potentially could lead to damage due to 
unreported discharges.”136  EPA’s 1998 SEPs Policy also provides 
that projects that have “environmental merit” may qualify as a 
SEP even if the projects do not fit within one of the seven specified 
categories, with the approval of EPA’s enforcement office.137
 A January 5, 2004 EPA Memorandum, Recommended Ideas for 
Supplemental Environmental Projects,138 includes an updated list 
of potential SEPs projects that EPA indicates it will support (any 
of these projects must still meet all conditions of the SEPs Policy if 
proposed for inclusion in a particular settlement).  Several of the 
types of projects EPA lists in this Memorandum similarly reflect 
EPA’s policy position that SEPs may encompass protection and 
restoration of ecosystems and ecosystem services: 
Implement projects that create, restore and/or pre-
serve threatened aquatic resources, including wet-
lands.  Mechanisms to accomplish this goal can in-
clude: 
- Aquatic resource restoration project 
- Land trust projects to preserve aquatic resources  
   threatened with degradation or destruction by  
   unregulated activities. 
- Purchasing and retiring credits from mitigation  
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id.; see also, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 132, at 5 (noting that “[f]or exam-
ple, by purchasing land or developing conservation programs for the land, a company could 
protect a natural habitat for wildlife or a source of drinking water. Beyond preservation, 
such a SEP might involve restoring natural areas that are vital to long-term protection of 
the environment or public health.”). Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24799; Bonorris et 
al., supra note 95, at 204 and n.149;  
 137.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24,796-801. 
 138.  Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Asst. Adm’rs 
et al., Recommended Ideas for Supplemental Environmental Projects (January 5, 2004) (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter Suarez, Recommended Ideas for SEPs]. EPA also has de-
veloped a more recent document entitled “Project Ideas for Potential Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects” (updated July 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/re-
sources/policies/civil/seps/potentialproject-seps0607.pdf.  The latter document is a list of 
possible SEPs that NGOs and government agencies have submitted.  EPA includes a dis-
claimer at the outset that “[i]nclusion of a project [on the list] does not constitute or imply 
[EPA’s] endorsement. . . .” Id. EPA also has encouraged its Regional offices to consider de-
velopment of SEP libraries. U.S. Envtl. Protect. Agency, Interim Guidance for Community 
Involvement in Supplemental Environmental Projects, 68 Fed. Reg. 35884, 35885 (June 17, 
2003) [hereinafter EPA, Community Involvement Guidance].    
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    banks approved by EPA and the Corps. 139
Some of EPA’s program-specific policies identify possible SEPs pro-
jects as well.  EPA’s Section 404 Penalty Policy, for example, offers 
the following regarding SEPs:  
SEPs are particularly encouraged in the Section 404 
program if the SEP results in protection of a wetland 
resource or other special aquatic site. For example, 
purchase and dedicated use of buffer land around a 
wetland helps ensure the survival of wetland re-
sources, and is an appropriate and valuable SEP, as 
is upland land acquisition lying in wetland mosaics. 
In addition, deeding over wetlands in perpetuity for 
the purpose of conservation promotes program inter-
ests and the goals of the Clean Water Act.140
 In short, EPA’s SEPs policies, and some of its program-specific 
enforcement policies, define permissible (and desirable) SEPs in a 
way that encompasses projects that will protect, enhance, and re-
store ecosystems.141  In at least some circumstances, these projects 
may focus on ecosystems other than the one that a violator has 
harmed.  In this way, SEPs would seem to have the potential to 
serve as a helpful compliment to EPA’s traditional injunctive relief 
authority in protecting and restoring ecosystems and the services 
they provide. 
3.  SEPs’ Penalty Mitigation Potential 
 The discussion in the preceding two sections highlights the po-
tential value of SEPs as a “beyond compliance” tool that EPA po-
tentially can use to require protection and restoration of ecosys-
tems.  A violator may, however, need to spend considerable funds 
to negotiate a SEP with EPA, to develop and implement the SEP, 
and to monitor and document its effectiveness.  Further, a violator 
 
 139.  Suarez, Recommended Ideas for SEPs, supra note 138. 
 140.  Memorandum from Sylvia Lowrance, Acting Asst. Adm’r, EPA OECA, to Waters 
Prot./Mgmt. Div. of Dir. et al., Issuance of Revised CWA Section 404 Settlement Penalty 
Policy 20 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ 
civil/cwa/404pen.pdf.  EPA’s 404 Policy continues that “restoration of any area of the viola-
tion, or any mitigation in the form of injunctive relief to remedy such violations (including 
mitigation for the temporal loss of wetlands functions and values), does not constitute a 
SEP.” Id. at 20. 
 141.  As indicated above, EPA’s SEPs policies identify a wide variety of projects that 
may qualify as SEPs. The 1998 Policy includes as a catchall category “other types of pro-
jects” that have environmental merit.   Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24800.    
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may take on new sanctionable commitments in agreeing to per-
form a SEP.  The obvious question is, why would an alleged viola-
tor agree to perform such “beyond compliance” work and accept the 
additional attendant liability risks.142  This is work the violator is 
not obligated to do, money it is not obligated to spend, and risks of 
punishment it is not required to accept. 
 The intuitive short answer is that EPA’s substantial penalty 
authority gives it significant leverage to negotiate SEPs, since EPA 
has indicated its willingness to reduce a penalty for a SEP.  EPA 
indicates in the 1998 SEPs Policy that 
Evidence of a violator’s commitment and ability to 
perform a SEP is also a relevant factor for EPA to 
consider in establishing an appropriate settlement 
penalty.   All else being equal, the final settlement 
penalty will be lower for a violator who agrees to 
perform an acceptable SEP compared to the violator 
who does not agree to perform a SEP.143
 The 1998 SEPs Policy spells out the extent to which EPA is 
prepared to reduce a payable penalty in exchange for a commit-
ment to perform a SEP.  Ordinarily, a penalty would be the sum of 
the economic benefit and gravity — in EPA’s words, “this sum is 
the minimum amount that would be necessary to settle the case 
without a SEP.”144  The SEPs Policy provides that “in settlements 
in which the defendant/respondent committed to conduct a SEP, 
the final settlement penalty must equal or exceed either: a) The 
economic benefit of noncompliance plus 10 percent of the gravity 
component; or b) 25 percent of the gravity component only; which-
ever is greater.”145  Thus, the SEPs Policy anticipates that EPA 
staff may mitigate up to 90% of the gravity component of a penalty 
in some cases, in exchange for a regulated party’s commitment to 
perform a SEP.  This is likely to be attractive to a violator, at least 
in cases in which the gravity component of a penalty is substantial. 
 Two examples make this clear.  Assume a situation in which 
EPA would seek a penalty of $500,000, based on the Agency’s cal-
culation of a $400,000 economic benefit and a $100,000 gravity 
component.  In this case, a violator would still have to pay a pen-
 
 142.  Another question involves the scope of EPA’s authority to encourage and agree to 
“beyond compliance” projects as a factor EPA will consider when determining an appropri-
ate penalty.  
 143.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24797.   See supra note 98 for other reasons 
why a regulated party might be interested in performing a SEP. 
 144.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24801. 
 145.  Id. 
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alty of $410,000, even if it committed to do a SEP.146  Next assume 
a situation in which the figures are reversed: the economic benefit 
is $100,000 and the gravity is $400,000.  Here, a violator conceiva-
bly could have its penalty reduced to $140,000.147  In the latter 
case, a violator has the ability to significantly reduce its penalty by 
performing a SEP; SEPs in such cases are likely to hold particular 
interest. 
 The SEPs Policy includes a number of other details relevant to 
deciding how much a SEP should reduce a payable penalty.  For 
example, EPA considers the “quality of the SEP” to determine 
what percentage of the SEP cost should be applied as mitigation 
against the amount EPA would settle for, but for the SEP. 148  EPA 
lists six factors to consider in evaluating the quality of SEPs.  Two 
are particularly relevant to ecosystem services.  Indeed, in its de-
scription of each factor EPA specifically refers to protection and 
restoration of ecosystems as reasons to provide maximum penalty 
reduction in exchange for a regulated party’s implementation of a 
project.   First, EPA considers “benefits to the public or environ-
ment at large.” 149  EPA notes that SEPS will “perform well” on 
this factor “to the extent they result in significant  and . . . meas-
urable progress in protecting and restoring ecosystems (including 
wetlands and endangered species habitats).”150  Second, EPA con-
siders “innovativeness.” 151  It elaborates on this factor as follows: 
SEPS which perform well on this factor will further 
the development, implementation, or dissemination 
of innovative processes, technologies, or methods 
which more effectively: reduce the generation, re-
lease or disposal of pollutants; conserve natural re-
sources; restore and protect ecosystems; protect en-
dangered species; or promote compliance.152   
 
 146.  The violator would have to pay the entire economic benefit of $400,000, plus ten 
percent of the gravity component of $100,000, for a total of $410,000. 
 147.  The violator would have to pay the entire economic benefit of $100,000, plus ten 
percent of the gravity component of $400,000, for a total of $140,000. 
 148.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802. The Policy defines the “SEP cost” to 
be the “net present after-tax cost of the SEP.” The notion of “SEP cost” has been the subject 
of considerable debate. See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96; Dana, supra note 96. 
 149.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. The other four factors that EPA considers in assessing the quality of the SEP 
and therefore the mitigation percentage the violator should receive, are environmental jus-
tice, community input, multimedia impacts, and pollution prevention. Id. SEP projects that 
are of high quality because of the factors discussed in the text presumably will fare even 
better if any of these other factors exists also. 
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EPA indicates that the “better the performance of the SEP under 
each of these factors, the higher the appropriate mitigation per-
centage.” 153
 A second key feature of SEPs’ impact on penalty amounts is 
that, with limited exceptions, the mitigation percentage may not 
exceed eighty percent of the SEP cost.154  Some commentators have 
criticized this limitation on the ground that it makes rational vio-
lators less likely to agree to perform SEPs.155  Even with this limi-
tation, however, the possibility exists for significant penalty reduc-
tion in exchange for a SEP in some circumstances. 
 The bottom line in terms of SEPs’ potential for penalty mitiga-
tion is that, particularly for substantial penalties that include a 
significant gravity component, EPA has significant leverage to en-
courage a regulated party to perform a SEP by offering in ex-
change a sizeable reduction in that component of the penalty.156
4.  Additional Implementation and Other Criteria 
 The SEPs Policy identifies several other key features for ac-
ceptable SEPs projects.  Two features are likely to be especially 
useful in terms of SEPs’ potential value as learning experiments.  
As indicated above, there is a lot to learn about ecosystems and the 
services they provide, and about the efficacy of different ap-
proaches in restoring or protecting such ecosystems and services.  
The Policy encourages efforts to fill this gap.  Further, it creates an 
expectation that defendants will bear the cost of such efforts.  The 
Policy provides that “[t]o the extent feasible, defen-
dant/respondents should be required to quantify the benefits asso-
ciated with the project and provide EPA with a report setting forth 
how the benefits were measured or estimated.”157  This feature of a 
SEPs project gives EPA the ability to encourage a violator to esti-
 
 153.  Id.    
 154.  Id.  In a 2000 memo, EPA’s Director of the Office of Regulatory Enforcement rein-
forced that the mitigation percentage should rarely exceed 80 percent of the SEP cost. 
Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, to Reg’l Coun-
sels, Appropriate Penalty Mitigation Credit under the SEP Policy (Apr. 14, 2000), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seppenmit-mem.pdf.  
 155.  See e.g., Kristl, supra note 96, at 42 (suggesting that EPA could increase violators’ 
incentives to do SEPs by increasing the extent to which the Agency is prepared to forgive a 
penalty in exchange for such a project, and recommending that EPA increase its mitigation 
percentage to one hundred percent of a SEP’s cost). Edward Lloyd has concluded that EPA’s 
approach to penalty mitigation is a “rational” one. See Lloyd, supra note 93, at 437. 
 156.  EPA encourages its staff to “consider giving more credit to a defendant who 
agrees to implement a SEP where there has been a commitment to include affected commu-
nities into the SEP selection.” EPA, Community Involvement Guidance, supra note 138, at 
35887. 
 157.  Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24803. 
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mate the benefits the project produces in terms of ecosystems ser-
vices.  To the extent that EPA is able to pursue such analyses in 
numerous settings throughout the country, involving a wide range 
of ecosystems and services, this experience is likely to advance 
learning about the value added from different types of projects in 
terms of their impacts on the services that ecosystems provide and 
the value of such services. 
 Similarly, the Policy requires violators to submit a final report 
to EPA that documents completion of the SEP and SEP expendi-
tures.158  Thus, in addition to fostering learning about benefits to 
ecosystems and the services they provide from different types of 
projects, SEPs have the potential to foster learning about the costs 
of such projects.  This type of information, too, is likely to be help-
ful to EPA and others interested in exploring options for protect-
ing, enhancing, and/or restoring ecosystems and the services they 
provide. 
 In sum, EPA’s SEPs policy reflects EPA’s view that it may ne-
gotiate enforcement settlements that commit violators to imple-
ment projects that protect, enhance, and restore ecosystems and 
the services they provide.  Such projects logically may include pro-
jects that: 1) help to diagnose the extent of ecosystem and ecosys-
tem services degradation; 2) identify and implement strategies to 
protect and/or improve the ecosystem and its services; and 3) 
monitor the effectiveness of the work done.  The fact that EPA can 
negotiate to have violators bear the responsibility and cost for un-
dertaking this work adds to the potential value of SEPs as a tool to 
advance understanding and protection of ecosystems and their 
services in a world of limited government resources.159
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 204 (making the same point with respect to state 
SEP programs, noting that “because regulators often lack resources to pursue cutting edge 
environmentally beneficial projects, state SEP programs provide a laboratory for innova-
tion”). While EPA settlements must be implemented by defendants, Final SEPs Policy at 
24,797-98, citizen-negotiated SEPs “are more often carried out by third parties, i.e., entities 
that are not parties to the litigation.” Lloyd, supra note 93, at 433. Prof. Lloyd includes sev-
eral examples of what he characterizes as successful use of SEPs in citizen suit settlements.    
Lloyd, supra note 93, at 444-448 (for example, a settlement with the City of New York for 
CWA violations that its sewage treatment plants committed, which led to creation of a $4 
million Long Island Sound and Jamaica Bay Dissolved Oxygen Fund, which is available to 
support land acquisition projects, habitat restoration, and water quality improvement pro-
jects or for studies benefiting Jamaica Bay or Long Island; and creation of the Quinnipiac 
River Fund, as part of the settlement of a case that NRDC and the Connecticut Fund for the 
Environment brought against Upjohn.   Upjohn agreed to make payments totaling 
$1,800,000 and the settlement provided that the money would be used to improve the envi-
ronmental quality of the Quinnipiac River and New Haven Harbor, the watersheds of these 
waterbodies, and otherwise to benefit the environment of these resources.   The illustrative, 
but not exclusive, listing of acceptable environmental projects provided in the settlement 
reads as follows: 1. studying the ecology of those waterbodies; 2. studying pollution of those 
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C. Challenges and Possible Opportunities 
 The preceding discussion is intended to suggest that SEPs have 
substantial promise as an enforcement tool to protect ecosystems 
and the services they provide, and that those interested in advanc-
ing such protection would be well-served by learning more about 
this tool and exploring its greater use.160
 The intriguing question about SEPs with which I end this sec-
tion is whether there are ways to enhance the value of SEPs for 
this purpose — are there steps EPA can take, for example, that are 
likely to increase the number of SEPs that protect ecosystems and 
the services they provide, or that increase the value such SEPs 
provide.  As noted above, the Annual Results data reflects that, 
despite EPA’s rhetorical support for SEPs, the track record over 
the past five years reflects stable (at best) use of SEPs since 2001, 
rather than increasing use.161  EPA’s own high-ranking enforce-
ment officials have touted the promise of SEPs to move well be-
yond this level.162
 There are some likely inherent limits in the use of SEPs.  
These include the additional transaction costs that regulated par-
ties and the Agency each need to invest to negotiate a SEP.  In 
some cases these are undoubtedly significant.  Thus, unless the 
potential penalty is significant, it may not be worth the transac-
tion costs to pursue a SEP.  Further, there are likely cases in 
which the regulated parties desire finality by concluding an en-
forcement matter, rather than agreeing to continuing obliga-
tions.163
 
waterbodies; 3. researching methods of reducing pollution or otherwise improving the envi-
ronmental health of those waterbodies; habitat restoration). 
 160.  Again, I am not suggesting that SEPs are necessarily the most desirable way to 
advance such goals (see, for example, Dana, supra note 96), or that their use does not raise 
concerns. See e.g., Greve, supra note 97. 
 161.  In his recent article, Kenneth Kristl claims to have made the first effort to ana-
lyze SEPs data from 1992-2005, and concludes that less than thirteen percent of settlements 
annually in cases involving penalties during this period included SEPs, and that this per-
centage has been “steadily declining” since the mid-1990s.   Kristl, supra note 96, at 2.   
Kristl’s data, which provide numbers of SEPs finalized rather than dollar value of SEPs 
negotiated, appear to show a highwater mark of 348 SEPs finalized in 1995.   Beginning in 
1998, the SEP numbers he reports are: 1) 1998: 221; 2) 1999: 197; 3) 2000: 193; 4) 2001: 164; 
5) 2002: 157; 6) 2003: 150; 7) 2004: 213; and 8) 2005: 207. Kristl, supra note 96, at 22-23. 
For a review of Kristl’s methodology, see Kristl, supra note 96.  EPA itself has suggested 
that there is a “tremendous opportunity” to increase negotiation of SEPs.   Suarez, Expand-
ing Use, supra note 103, at 1.  Because SEPs are limited to enforcement settlements, it is 
important to consider the numbers of SEPs negotiated in the context of the number of set-
tlements finalized each year. 
 162.  Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103. 
 163.  Telephone Interview with Beth Cavalier and Melissa Raack, EPA SEPs Coordina-
tors, in Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2006). EPA’s 1998 SEPs Policy indicates that EPA will 
hold a violator liable for not completing a SEP satisfactorily and may impose additional 
590  JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 22.2 
 
                                                                                                                  
 Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to explore whether there are 
strategies that might operate to increase the use of SEPs given 
their apparent promise.  I offer below four possible approaches to 
increase the use of SEPs, assuming this is the policy direction of 
choice.  None of these is intended to be a panacea — challenges 
will remain, and there are policy reasons not to pursue some of 
these approaches, in addition to reasons to consider them. 
 1.  Revamping the process for proposing and approving SEPs, 
and the substantive criteria for doing so.  One obvious place to look 
for possible opportunities for EPA to improve upon its SEPs per-
formance is at the processes the agency uses to review and approve 
SEPs, and at the substantive criteria it applies in doing so.  The 
current process does not appear seamless, in a number of respects. 
 One question is whether there are steps EPA can take that 
would streamline or expedite the process for identifying SEPs and 
then reaching agreement with a regulated party on an appropriate 
SEP for a particular case.  EPA’s policies place EPA staff in a reac-
tive position with respect to SEPs.  EPA may react to a regulated 
party’s proposal to include a particular SEP in an enforcement set-
tlement, but EPA staff may not propose a SEP themselves.164  This 
approach would seem to create the potential for a “we’ll know it 
when we see it” scenario, a structure unlikely to inspire violators 
to pursue creative possibilities for SEPs.165  EPA reports that it 
has made progress in educating regulated parties about the likely 
parameters for acceptable SEPs, through creation of libraries of 
SEPs projects and other steps.166  Close review is needed, however, 
 
penalties if this occurs. Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24802. Further, a violator may 
not transfer this liability to the contractor or consultant that it retains to help it to imple-
ment a SEP, if it does so. Id. Interestingly, the Final SEPs Policy also provides that a viola-
tor should pay stipulated damages if it completes the SEP for less money than estimated. 
Specifically, if the SEP costs less than ninety percent of the estimated cost, the violator 
must pay between ten and twenty-five percent of the original mitigation awarded percent. 
Id. at 24,803. 
 164.  EPA currently expects a violator to propose a particular SEP, rather than do so 
itself.   Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 213; Kristl, supra note 96, at 40; U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects 
Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 24858 (May 10, 1995).  Some states follow this approach while others do 
not.  Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at n.209 & 210.   EPA officials informed me that EPA 
may provide suggestions for a SEP if a violator asks.   In addition, as noted above, EPA’s 
website includes a list of potential projects, and EPA staff often direct alleged violators to 
that website.  EPA may also encourage an alleged violator to reach out to community 
groups, who may have ideas for projects that could be considered as a SEP.  E-mail from 
Beth Cavalier, supra note 104. 
 165.  Separation of powers concerns have motivated some governments to follow this 
approach. The concern is that the administrator otherwise might implement “her own pro-
grammatic agenda under the guise of environmental enforcement.”  See Bonorris et al., su-
pra note 95, at 213. 
 166.  See e.g., EPA, Community Involvement Guidance, supra note 138, at 35,887; Bon-
orris et al., supra note 95, at 213, 214 (regarding state initiatives of this sort and identifying 
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of the effectiveness of these initial steps, and of the opportunity to 
improve upon these actions by doing more to inform regulated par-
ties of the types of SEPs that would be acceptable in particular in-
stances.  Further, it would be worthwhile to explore the extent to 
which putting EPA staff in a reactive position, rather than allow-
ing them to identify SEPs they believe would be particularly use-
ful, dampens EPA staffs’, and regulated parties’, enthusiasm for 
SEPs.167
 A second issue, which concerns both process and substance, in-
volves the extent to which EPA Headquarters has sent its staff a 
“mixed message” in terms of the enthusiasm they should have in 
pursuing SEPs.  Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, in addition to 
its expressions of encouragement to Regional staff to pursue SEPs, 
EPA Headquarters also has issued a variety of memoranda that 
would seem to have the opposite effect.  In particular, EPA has 
sent out what Regional staff would likely consider to be mixed sig-
nals by: 1) cautioning Regional staff that they should consult with 
Headquarters personnel before approving a SEP if there is any 
question concerning nexus; and 2) warning staff that they face 
dismissal and sanctions if they approve a SEP inappropriately.168  
The practical consequence of this direction, given the apparent 
considerable confusion that exists about the definition of nexus, 169 
 
Delaware, Maine, and Illinois as having created SEP libraries); Suarez, Expanding Use, 
supra note 103, at 1 (discussing the “piloting [of] a SEP library which will serve as a clear-
inghouse for possible SEPs.”).    
 167.  There are procedural justice as well as distributive justice issues associated with 
the identification, review, and approval of SEPs, and one question is whether the current 
process is structured appropriately in terms of each of these sets of issues. See David L. 
Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspective on Government Decision Making Processes as a 
Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651 (2006) for a review of procedural 
and distributive justice. 
 168.  Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 2 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3302(d)). 
The opening sentence provides that “[t]he purpose of this memo is to emphasize the impor-
tance of nexus in evaluating proposed [SEPs]” and it indicates that nexus is importance to 
“avoid[ ] problems related to the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (MRA).” Id. at 1. EPA indicates 
that the MRA requires that an EPA “official that receives money for the Government from 
any source shall deposit the money in the Treasury . . . .”   Id. at 2 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 
3302(b)). The memorandum also notes that penalties for violating the MRA include removal 
from office and personal liability for the amount of money misappropriated. Id. (citing 31 
U.S.C. § 3302(d)). Professor Kristl takes the position that “elimination or substantial relaxa-
tion of the nexus requirement would create significant opportunities for increasing SEP 
utilization.” Kristl, supra note 96, at 3. In Kristl’s view, the EPA/DOJ fixation on nexus as a 
way to minimize EPA’s problematic legal authority to negotiate SEPs is misplaced; he ar-
gues that the “nexus requirement” is “not legally justified.” Id. at 3, 24. 
 169.  EPA Headquarters noted in memos in 2002 and 2003 that there was considerable 
confusion about the definition of nexus. In a 2003 memo EPA indicated that  
 
several Regional and Headquarters offices raised questions about the 
complexity of the existing SEP Policy.   Specifically, we heard a number 
of questions concerning how to define an appropriate nexus in certain 
situations, and whether or not nexus can be waived in particular cir-
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is that Regional staff are likely to favor consultations in a substan-
tial number of cases where SEPs might be in play. 
 EPA includes a list of “action items” in its June 2003 SEPs 
Guidance that identify steps the Agency committed to take to ef-
fect improvements in the SEPs policy.  The Agency, while reaffirm-
ing that nexus is “important to ensure compliance with the MRA 
and . . . cannot be waived,” also indicated that EPA believed that 
“there may be ways to simplify nexus, and still ensure that there 
remains a connection between the underlying violation and the 
SEP.”170  While the Agency indicated in 2003 that it was “launch-
ing an effort to simplify the SEP Policy,”171 in a recent article Pro-
fessor Kenneth Kristl refers to EPA’s current guidance on nexus as 
“a kind of ‘we know it when we see it’ platitude.”172  He indicates 
that, while “as of 2003, the agency knew that the nexus issue con-
tinued to create internal issues and that further clarification was 
necessary-though so far it has not issued such a clarification.”173  
Professor Kristl continues: “In lieu of providing guidance on how to 
deal with such circumstances [when nexus is not clear], the memo-
randum in effect takes the decision out of the hands of enforcement 
personnel and puts it squarely within USEPA headquarters.”174  
 
cumstances . . . . Given this . . . we believe that there may be ways to 
simplify nexus. . . .” 
 
Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 3.  A 2002 EPA Memorandum similarly reflected 
EPA Headquarters’ awareness that the nexus requirement was a source of confusion for 
staff with the front lines capacity to negotiate SEPs, noting that Headquarters “continues to 
receive many inquiries from enforcement staff regarding nexus in reviewing proposed 
SEPs.”  Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra note 123, at 1.  
 170.  Id. at 3. 
 171.  Suarez, Expanding Use, supra note 103, at 2. 
 172.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 240. 
 173.  Id. at 245. 
 174.  Id. at 241. I reviewed the entire list of SEPs Memoranda, Policies, and Guidance 
to try to determine the approval process EPA uses. The only documents that I found that 
are relevant are the April 1998 Final SEPs Policy itself, and a July 21, 1998 Memorandum 
from Eric Schaeffer, then Director of EPA’s Office of Regulatory Enforcement, entitled Re-
vised Approval Procedures for Supplemental Environmental Projects (July 21, 1998). The 
July 21, 1998 memorandum indicates that SEPs that do not meet all of the legal guidelines 
“may require Assistant Administrator approval” and will require a legal analysis from the 
relevant staff explaining why the project is within EPA’s legal authority. Further, all pro-
jects that “may not fully comply” with the SEPs Policy “must be approved” by the OECA 
Assistant Administrator. For “other” projects, the appropriate OECA official has approval 
authority, with consultation by the Special Litigation and Projects Division, unless other-
wise delegated. Otherwise, per the April 1998 Policy, “the authority of a government official 
to approve a SEP is included in the official’s authority to settle an enforcement case and 
thus, subject to the exceptions set forth here, no special approvals are required.” April 1998 
Final SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 20 (section J).  EPA officials advised me that the major-
ity of SEPs do not need Headquarters approval.   They indicated that only two categories of 
SEPs need approval from the media-specific enforcement division director in Headquarters: 
Compliance Promotion SEPs and Other SEPs and this is usually done quickly, and is not a 
burdensome process.  In addition, a settlement may need approval from the AA for OECA if 
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His pessimistic conclusion is that EPA’s more recent memoranda 
on SEPs “likely result[ ] in eliminating nexus as a useful policy 
concept that can guide Agency staff or defendants seeking to con-
duct SEPs because it is difficult to tell just what is needed to sat-
isfy the nexus requirement.”175
 Headquarters’ cautionary notes to the Regions about SEPs 
seem to be worth investigating further for their possible impact on 
regional interest in negotiating SEPs.  These memos raise a con-
ventional “efficacy of delegation” issue.176  Part of the answer to 
this question lies in the empirical data, which has not been com-
piled to my knowledge — questions concerning the number of cases 
in which the Regions have negotiated SEPs without Headquarters 
input compared to the number of cases in which the Regions 
sought such input; the level of effort required to solicit and obtain 
Headquarters “sign-off” on SEPs projects (e.g., the number of peo-
ple to be contacted and the number of approvals required, the level 
of effort needed to initiate and complete such contacts, the amount 
and length of time it took to pursue this consultation process, etc.); 
and the results of consultations with Headquarters (e.g., the num-
ber of cases in which SEPs were ultimately negotiated, the number 
of situations in which SEPs were significantly modified, the num-
ber of cases in which SEPs fell through, etc.).  Intuitively, it would 
seem that the greater the transaction costs associated with obtain-
ing “sign-off” or pursuing other consultations, and the less likely 
the consultations are to pay dividends, the less likely a regional 
official would be to bother.  Thus, it seemingly would be worth-
while to try to assess the costs these signals engendered and, if the 
costs appear to be significant, it would seem to be worthwhile to 
consider alternative delegation structures that might yield a more 
effective balancing of concerns about possible Regional missteps 
with the desire to encourage the Regions to pursue SEPs. 
 Professor Kristl’s conclusion appears to be that, conceptually, it 
is logical to assume that EPA’s cautionary notes have led EPA offi-
cials to play it safe and not be overly ambitious in pursuing possi-
ble SEPs: 
Without clear guidance on what nexus really is, 
Agency personnel and defendants are likely to ‘play 
it safe’ and choose projects that have been approved 
 
the minimum penalty requirement is not met; again, this is not usually a lengthy process.  
E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104. 
 175.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 19 (referring to Smith, Importance of the Nexus, supra 
note 123). 
  176.  See Markell, Slack, supra note 26, at 21. 
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before or simply avoid SEPs altogether instead of 
exploring new ways of utilizing SEPs that might in 
fact be at the outer limits of nexus. 177
His further view is that the empirical data on SEPs support this 
perspective.  These data show a “steady decline” in the actual 
number of SEPs and in “annual SEP utilization rates” after 1995, 
which is when EPA issued an earlier version of its SEPs Policy 
that included an “emphasis on nexus and lowered the mitigation 
percentage ceiling from 100% to 80%.”178  He contends that these 
data “strongly suggest that a link between these policy changes 
and the SEP utilization declines is more than simply coinciden-
tal.”179
 EPA officials from whom I sought input offered a different per-
spective: 
It is not accurate to look at the numbers of SEPs 
without also considering the number of enforcement 
cases concluded each year, as SEPs cannot occur in 
the absence of an enforcement action.  The number 
of enforcement actions concluded each year varies.  
The percentage of settlements each year that include 
a SEP has remained constant at approximately 9-
10% over the past several years.   The data does not 
support the conclusion that there has been a decline 
in the inclusion of SEPs in settlements.180
 In either case—a decline in SEPs as Kristl suggests, or a rela-
tively stable level of use, as EPA contends—the type of data-
gathering effort I suggest above might yield insights about why 
SEPs use has not increased, despite Headquarters encouragement 
 
 177.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 19. 
 178.  Id. at 23-24. 
 179.  Id. at 24.   Kristl suggests that relaxing or eliminating nexus requirements would 
enable EPA to approve a wider variety of SEP projects. He suggests that the nexus re-
quirement creates limits on aggregation of SEPs based on factors such as geography and 
time that, if relaxed, would create a “more hospitable environment for SEPs and the bene-
fits they can produce. . . .” Id. at 36. The Hastings Report, in contrast, concluded that legal 
doctrine supports a nexus requirement and recommends that states include a variant of 
nexus in their policies. Bonorris et al., supra note 95, at 188. The Hastings Report also indi-
cates that: “Most state environmental protection agencies find themselves in the same posi-
tion as EPA, fashioning settlements not expressly authorized by their legislatures.   PLRI 
has uncovered no state court case finding that a state environmental agency overstepped its 
statutory authority in implementing SEPs.” Id. at 195. The Hastings Report also indicates 
that “PLRI research indicates that no court has ever invalidated an EPA-approved settle-
ment with a SEP.” Id. at 196.   
 180.  E-mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104. 
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to negotiate SEPs and outsider predictions that such increases 
were likely to occur. 
 One fix to at least some of these issues that would likely in-
crease SEPs use significantly would be for Congress specifically to 
empower EPA to negotiate SEPs.  EPA has developed many of the 
administrative constraints it has created for SEPs because of con-
cerns about the agency’s legal authority to pursue SEPs.181  Clear 
Congressional endorsement for SEPs would alleviate these con-
cerns and, depending on Congress’s direction, might be a signifi-
cant inducement for more aggressive agency pursuit of such pro-
jects. 182
 2.  Revising the incentives for regulated parties to agree to con-
duct SEPs.  One way to increase regulated parties’ incentives to 
pursue SEPs is for EPA to increase the financial benefit violators 
reap by doing so.  One possibility in this arena is for EPA to reduce 
penalties by one hundred percent of the cost of the SEP project, 
rather than limit the reduction to eighty percent of the project’s 
cost, as is currently the case.183  In other words, rather than give a 
violator at most a $0.80 reduction in penalty for a $1.00 SEP, EPA 
should give the violator a full $1.00 reduction.  Professor Kristl, 
urging such a change in his recent article, criticizes the “clear ‘sec-
ond rate’ status that dollars spent on SEPs suffer” under EPA’s 
SEP policies.184  He argues that this eighty percent limitation in 
mitigation is “neither legally nor economically justified,” and that 
“allowing dollar-for-dollar penalty reductions would create signifi-
cant opportunities for increasing SEP utilization.”185  Kristl con-
tends that raising the mitigation percentage to one hundred per-
cent (and abolishing nexus, as discussed above) are “simple, legally 
justifiable steps that will unshackle SEPs and allow the maximum 
environmental benefits possible.”186  To date, EPA has concluded 
 
 181.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 25-26. 
 182.  Commentators have suggested that only the CAA specifically provides for SEPs.   
Kristl, supra note 96, at 25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) which allows a court to order that 
civil penalties be used in beneficial mitigation projects rather than be deposited in the U.S. 
Treasury).  See also Nicholas Targ et al., The Possibility of SEP Legislation and Lessons 
from the Fifty States, TRENDS (ABA-SEER), July/August 2007, at 4. 
 183.  EPA considers the after-tax cost of the SEP in order to prevent a violator from 
benefiting twice.  As a result, the defendant should not get economic value for doing a SEP 
that should raise the value of a SEP dollar.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 37. See also, Final 
SEPs Policy, supra note 90, at 24801. Other possible reasons to discount SEP dollars in-
clude: 1) the possibility that a violator reaps a public relations benefit from a SEP; and 2) 
SEPs have less deterrent effect than penalties. Kristl, supra note 96, at 37-38. 
 184.  Kristl, supra note 96, at 36. 
 185.  Id. at 3-4. 
 186.  Id. at 4. As Kristl indicates, EPA’s 1991 SEP Policy allowed a penalty reduction 
as high as one hundred percent of a SEP’s value. Id. 
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that such a change may increase concerns about the MRA.187  
Unless the government revisits this issue and reaches a different 
conclusion, a legislative fix might be needed to effect this change in 
approach. 
 3.  Revising EPA’s measures for evaluating enforcement per-
formance to create greater incentives for Regional Staff to encour-
age SEPs.  Other changes that might be effective in encouraging 
SEPs go beyond the world of SEPs.  One such change involves the 
measures EPA uses to evaluate enforcement performance.  EPA 
traditionally has used “output” measures as one indicator of en-
forcement performance — e.g., the number of inspections con-
ducted each year, or the number of cases brought in a particular 
year.  To the extent that EPA staff are evaluated based on these 
sorts of “beans,” or activity measures, such measures seem to have 
the potential to create disincentives for staff to pursue time-
consuming projects, including SEPs.  This is not necessarily the 
case, of course.  An appropriately calibrated weighting system 
might give a Regional official or office more credit for a time-
consuming project (like a SEP) than for a less time-consuming one 
(such as a “simple” penalty case).  The question is whether current 
measures, and the weight attached to them, may create manage-
ment-based disincentives to undertake particularly environmen-
tally valuable work, including negotiating SEPs that yield espe-
cially useful results.  Research into EPA’s current performance 
measures would be helpful in determining the extent to which per-
formance measures serve to discourage (or encourage) EPA staff to 
pursue SEPs. 
 4.  Expanding EPA’s administrative enforcement authority.  A 
final set of possible actions that might encourage SEPs would in-
volve an expansion of EPA’s administrative enforcement authority.  
EPA’s SEPs Coordinators indicate that most SEPs are negotiated 
in the context of administrative rather than judicial settlements.188  
On the one hand, this is not surprising since EPA brings many 
more administrative than judicial cases.189  Further, steering a 
proposed SEP through multiple agency bureaucracies may well 
entail increased transaction costs.190
 On the other hand, because some of EPA’s statutes allow for 
more limited penalties in the administrative setting than in judi-
 
 187.  E-Mail from Beth Cavalier, supra note 104.    
 188.  Telephone Interview with Beth Cavalier and Melissa Raack, supra note 163.   
 189.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, FY 2005  PER-
FORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2005) available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/ 
finstatement/2005par/par05.pdf. 
 190.  EPA and DOJ both typically would need to sign-off on a judicial settlement, while 
only EPA would typically sign-off on an administrative settlement.   
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cial enforcement,191 there are a variety of reasons why one might 
expect SEPs to be particularly promising in cases that EPA cur-
rently lacks jurisdiction to settle.  Judicial cases are likely to be 
the more significant cases that warrant higher penalties, and 
therefore are more likely to involve environmental harm.  Further, 
the higher penalties available in judicial cases seemingly would 
give EPA more leverage to reduce penalties in exchange for per-
formance of a SEP. 
 One option is for Congress to increase EPA’s administrative 
penalty authorities.  Congress has made legislative changes of this 
sort (increasing penalty authorities, including administrative pen-
alties) as it has amended the major regulatory statutes over the 
past twenty years.  Congress initially did not provide administra-
tive penalty authority in the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts, for 
example.192  It only created such authorities in later iterations of 
these laws.193  For the Clean Air Act, Congress first established 
administrative penalty authority in its 1990 Amendments to that 
Act.194  One option is for Congress to adopt in the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts its RCRA model, by eliminating the artificial 
limits it has included in the former two statutes on administrative 
penalties vis-à-vis civil penalties.195
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 Ecosystems provide enormously important services to our spe-
cies, in addition to the non-anthropomorphic benefits they pro-
duce.196  Yet, many knowledgeable scholars have complained that 
we have failed to design systems of governance that recognize this 
reality or devote sufficient attention to understanding or protect-
ing the services ecosystems provide.  The consequence is that we 
 
 191.  The CWA and CAA each provides for higher penalties in judicial civil cases than 
in administrative civil cases.  CWA §§ 309(d), (g) (2006); CAA §§ 113(b), (d) (2006). 
 192.  Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on 
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368-69 (2000). 
 193.  CWA § 309(g) (2006); CAA § 113(d) (2006).  
 194.  CAA § 113(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2000); Christopher M. Wynn, Facing a 
Hobson’s Choice? The Constitutionality of the EPA’s Administrative Compliance Order En-
forcement Scheme under the Clean Air Act, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1879, 1892-93 (2005). 
 195.  For discussions of the appropriateness of judicial and administrative penalties, 
see  David L. Markell, “Reinventing Government”: A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating 
the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994’s Approach to Intergovernmental Relations, 24 
ENVTL. L. 1055 (1994); Herz & Devins, supra note 192, at 1368-69. 
 196.  Ecosystems and other parts of our natural environment have value in ways other 
than the services they provide to humans.   Thus, a focus solely on such services risks un-
der-valuing these natural resources and poses a challenge for those interested in preserving 
such resources for other reasons.   The question of how best to approach this challenge is a 
critical one, but it is beyond the scope of this article.  
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under-value these services quite substantially and, as a result, we 
squander them in various ways. 
 In the world of ecosystems and the services they provide, igno-
rance is unlikely to be bliss.  Instead, it is a recipe for ill-informed 
market-place decisions and for ill-informed policy choices that lead 
to under-protection of our natural environment.  There are numer-
ous strategies for learning more about the threats that human ac-
tivity poses to ecosystems and their services and for enhancing 
protection of such systems and restoration of systems that have 
sustained harm.  Market-based approaches offer considerable 
promise,197 as do new or refined regulatory regimes.  In this effort 
to consider these questions in the context of regulatory enforce-
ment, my tentative conclusion is that, at both the conceptual level 
and in the real world, enforcement has promise to serve as an ef-
fective tool to help us improve our understanding of ecosystems 
and the services they provide, and to aid in protecting and restor-
ing such ecosystems and services.  In addition to suggesting some 
possible regulatory fixes myself to advance the goal of more effec-
tive protection of ecosystems and the services they provide, this 
article is intended to serve as a challenge to regulatory aficionados 
and experts in various types of ecosystems to consider how best to 
structure and use these enforcement tools (and compliance promo-
tion more generally) to achieve this important public policy objec-
tive. 
 
 197.  See, e.g., Salzman, supra notes 3,6,11; PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO YANO, ECO-
FINANCE: THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL IN-
STRUMENTS (2004). 
